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1, SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines patterns of wealth differentiation and rural poverty in the extensive 
pastoral livestock sector of Mongolia. The paper draws on research carried out during 1993 
and early 1994 for the Policy Alternatives for Livestock Development (PALD) project and 
also draws on observations made in a socio economic survey carried out for the Asian 
Development Bank Livestock Feed Improvement Project also by PALD between June and 
September 1993. 
The emergence of both absolute and relative poverty in rural Mongolia is becoming an issue of 
increasing concern as the effects of market reform are felt throughout the country and impact 
particularly on a growing section of the rural poor. Despite this, most government and donor 
activity in the last few years has concentrated on urban poverty issues; only recently has 
emphasis been placed on the experience of poverty among the rural population (UNDP 1994; 
Government of Mongolia 1994). 
Even so, policies to address the needs of the livestock sector are still at an early stage, largely 
because the scale of rural poverty is both difficult to assess and widely disputed. First, there is 
no real agreement on what constitutes a minimum herd size (and thus a rural poverty 
threshold) and second, there is a widely held belief that few herding households are really poor 
because all have the potential to be self-sufficient in livestock production and so are less 
vulnerable to poverty than other sectors of the population. This ignnores the fact that some 
rural households have insufficient livestock to meet subsistence needs and that many 
households, such as those headed by women or the elderly, have insufficient labour to meet 
their needs. 
Attention to the needs of the rural livestock sector is important for a number of reasons. In 
addition to the general goal of social equity, the efficiency and productivity of all members of 
the herding population is critical to the economy as a whole. Pastoral livestock production 
accounts for 70 percent of agricultural production, and employs 34 percent of the 
economically active population; it is therefore in no sense a marginal sector of economic 
activity. A focus on poverty in the rural areas then, is important first because it offsets some 
bias in research and activity towards urban areas and second because the herding economy and 
the inviduals within it are of fundamental importance to the Mongolian economy as a whole. 
What do we mean when we talk about poverty in the Mongolian context? Poverty generally 
can be defined in different ways, from the inability to earn or consume enough, to the inability 
to achieve a secure and sustainable livelihood. Poverty can also be defined by lack of sufficient 
wealth or assets. \ 
Income poverty, the commonest standard and the one used in Mongolia, is measured by 
estimating the number of people below a minimum level of household income needed to buy 
the most basic needs. This minimum level or poverty line is usually based on recommended 
calorie requirements or the estimated cost of a bundle of goods (including food and shelter) 
necessary for survival. An individual's survival is threatened if she falls below this level (UNDP 
1994, Kabeer 1989). Closely related to the idea of income poverty is the idea of asset or 
wealth poverty measured as the lack of sufficient assets such as livestock or labour necessary 
for survivial. This concept of poverty is the most relevant to the Mongolian case where 
ownership of livestock (and the size of household herd) is the most common way in which 
wealth and poverty are measured. 
But income and assets are not the only factors determining the well-being of an individual, 
since an increase in real income may not lead to an increase in a person's ability to gain access 
to public goods such as health, education or transport (Lipton & Ravallion 1994, UNDP 
1994). In order to widen the definition of poverty therefore, it is important to include the 
capabilities approach. Under this approach, income is not seen as an end in itself but as a 
means which enables individuals to acheive desired ends. How far income influences well-
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being depend on a range of factors including an individual's personal or environmental 
circumstances. In the Mongolian context, individuals with enough income may lack mobility 
(for reasons of age, gender, disability), which may isolate them from society and prevent them 
from gaining regular access to markets or services. 
This paper looks at wealth and poverty in three ecological areas of Mongolia and illustrates 
the range of factors which contribute to increasing poverty and risk among the rural 
population. These include the nature of market reforms and the removal of collective subsidies 
and support, which have increased the range of risks faced by herders and led to increasing 
levels of poverty and vulnerability. This means that the focus of the paper is less on the state 
of poverty (how far basic needs are satisfied) and more on the process of poverty - "the 
interlocking sequence of events ...by which individuals move from a higher to a lower level of 
wellbeing" (Kabeer 1989). 
Since 1990, Mongolia has experienced rapid economic and political change as it moves from a 
centrally planned to a market based economy. A major part of its programme of economic 
transformation has involved reform of the agricultural sector made up largely of extensive 
livestock husbandry or mobile pastoralism. 
Between 1950 and 1990 rural people were collective (negdel) or state farm employees. The 
collective was primarily an economic unit responsible for marketing livestock products, 
supplying inputs and consumer goods as well as fodder and transport services to its members. 
The collective covered the same territory as a single district (sum), which was responsible for 
providing health, education and veterinary services. 
Collectives were divided into production brigades or teams, which were further broken down 
into suurs, individual production units made up usually of one or two households. The 
collective set production targets for each suur determining the quantity of meat, wool and 
other products to be supplied according to the annual state procurement order. Each suur was 
usually responsible for the production of a single species herd, for which a monthly salary was 
paid. Households also owned a small number of private animals which could be sold or used 
for their own consumption (Mearns 1991). 
Beginning in September 1991 the collectives began to be privatised as part of a major 
programme of economic liberalisation. Collectives have been transformed into shareholding 
(joint stock) or limited liability companies, voluntary cooperatives or disbanded altogether 
(Mearns 1993). Where collectives have disbanded, herders are fully private and entirely 
responsible for marketing their livestock, which are privately owned. Where companies 
remain, their management and organisational structure is very similar to that of the collective. 
In some cases the animals are privately owned but herders are supported by collectively 
managed services provided by the company; in others herders lease livestock from the 
company, receive a salary and supply livestock products as under the collective. 
The provision of inputs and services to herders in the transition period has been severely 
constrained by economic and logistical problems. Rising fuel prices and fuel shortages have 
affected the harvesting of fodder and the supply of supplementary feed, the availability of 
transport for nomadic moves and transport of livestock products to urban centres. Even where 
subsidised services still exist they are often erratic or provided at a high cost. Veterinery and 
medical services are also introducing a large element of cost recovery (PALD 1993a). As the 
cost and burden of risk inherent in herding production is gradually transferred from the state 
onto the individual, herders are reverting to traditional risk management strategies, developing 
multi-species herds and returning to customary and more localised levels of cooperation for 
the management of labour and the production of hay and other inputs (PALD 1993b, Swift 
and Mearns 1993). 
Thus, while the privatisation of livestock gave new opportunities in livestock ownership and 
herd management to the vast majority of herders, the benefits were not evenly distributed. The 
economic difficulties that accompanied the transition meant that even the richest herders 
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experienced difficulties in exploiting market opportunity, while poorer households had even 
fewer mechanisms of support available to them than in the past. The result has been increasing 
patterns of wealth differentiation in livestock ownership and household incomes as households 
idjust to a range of climatic and economic risks and an increasing reliance on informal patterns 
of support among poorer households. 
The paper is organised as follows. Part 2 explains the field work methodology. Part 3 
discusses the process of transition to a market based economy in Mongolia and the conditions 
which have led to the emergence of poverty generally and in rural areas in particular. 
Part 4 considers the changing nature of the herding environment in three sample areas and 
looks at the privatisation process and changing levels of service provision to rural areas. 
Parts 5 and 6 look at patterns of wealth differentiation between herding households using case 
study data from the three areas studied. Part 5 examines patterns of livestock ownership, herd 
structure and sales and marketing. Part 6 looks at the incomes and expenditures of rural 
households. 
Part 7 considers local perceptions and measurements of rural poverty, sets out the main 
characteristics of poor households in the pastoral economy and looks at how increased 
household vulnerability to certain risks such as livestock loss has contributed to increasing 
poverty. 
Part 8 considers the ways in which rural poverty is managed both formally and informally, and 
considers the increasing importance of localised, kin-based customary institutions in sustaining 
the labour and consumption requirements of the most vulnerable households. 
Part 9 discusses the main conclusions of the paper and briefly outlines ways in which present 
interventions can be improved and developed into a comprehensive strategy to address rural 
poverty. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
The methods employed in the research included rapid rural appraisal techniques (wealth 
ranking) and semi-structured interviews with individual herding households. 
Most research took place at three sites: 
• Tariat sum, Arkhangai aimag 
• Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai aimag 
• Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor aimag 
The first two sites were areas of previous PALD research; the third was an area which 
experienced heavy livestock losses during the dzud (freezing heavy snow) of March 1993. 
These sites are in different ecological areas and have different patterns of livestock ownership 
provide a range of representative herding environments, as Table 1 shows. 
Table 1 Livestock ownership in sample sums 
Sum Aimag Ecological Livestock Ownership 
(District) (Province) Zone End 1992 
Tariat 
Kharkhorin 
Bayan-Tsagaan 
Arkhangai 
Ovorkhangai 
Bayankhonger 
Mountain-Forest 
Steppe 
Central-Eastern 
Steppe 
Altai 
(Mountain 
Gobi ecozone) 
99% Private 
1% Company 
61% Private 
31% Company 
8% Other 
73% Private 
27% Company 
Source: Sum statistics 
Each sum was visited for a period of two to three weeks during which at least five days were 
spent collecting secondary data and interviewing sum officials. Data gathered included 
information on the privatisation process, the types of livestock ownership in the sum, poverty 
statistics and the level of health and education provision. 
Field work was concentrated in a single administrative district {bag) within each sum.1 These 
were Tsagaan Nuur bag, Tariat sum, Jalbaa bag, Kharkhorin sum and Bag No.l, Bayan 
Tsagaan sum.2 Data gathered for households in each chosen bag included size and 
composition of livestock holdings, and household size. 
The bag is the smallest administrative unit below sum (district) level. Each sum is usually 
divided into between five and seven bags, each containing from 100 to 200 households 
2. Throughout the text each area will be referred to by sum and aimag name only. 
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The initial classification of households in each bag was done through wealth ranking using the 
card sorting method developed by Grandin (1988) (see also Mearns et al 1992 for a previous 
Mongolian example). This was done as follows: 
Three key informants with good local knowledge were chosen from each bag. Each informant 
divided cards marked with the names of all the household heads into four groups from rich to 
poor households based on their own criteria. Each household was then given a score 
according to the group in which they were placed. The average weighted scores of each 
informant were then calculated to produce a single classification of all households in the bag 
ranked from richest to poorest. This was then divided into four wealth groups. 
This classification was used to select sample households for semi-structured interviewing. In 
two cases (Arkhangai and Ovorkhangai) this sampling was purposive; based on wealth ranking 
but with some bias towards richer and very poor households. In the third case (Bayankhongor) 
random sampling was used. 
A total of 65 households were interviewed about a range of issues, including perceptions of 
wealth and poverty, household consumption, and general poverty issues. Within this sample, 
50 households were interviewed about annual livestock sales. A further 10 households within 
the larger sample were interviewed about their detailed incomes and expenditures. Data from 
an additional 32 households collected during previous PALD research (PALD 1993b) were 
used in the analysis of household income patterns, making a total sample for this analysis of 42 
households. 
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3. TRANSITION TO THE MARKET ECONOMY AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
POVERTY 
Between 1950 and 1989 Mongolia's development was characterised by capital intensive 
industrialisation based on heavy industry, created and supported by imports, subsidies and 
expertise from the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries. The dependence of the 
Mongolian economy on the Soviet bloc as a market for exports and as a source of investment 
was considerable. By 1989, 90 percent of exports and 93 percent of imports occurred with the 
USSR and CMEA countries. (Lee 1993). By 1990 Mongolia obtained 40 percent of consumer 
goods, 80 percent of supplies and 90 percent of technical machinery from the Soviet union. 
Mongolia gained in other ways too: its economic and political ties with the Soviet Union 
brought important investments in health, education and social security, providing an important 
social safety net in urban and rural areas. 
However, the economy was very inefficient. The heavy dependence on imports meant that the 
industrial sector was largely uncompetitive, with negative value added when compared with 
world market prices. In addition, concentration on the industrial sector meant neglect of the 
large agricultural sector dominated by pastoral livestock production. The terms of trade 
remained consistently against agriculture, with prices to rural producers remaining unchanged 
for three decades until 1991 (Lee 1993; UNDP 1994). 
The transition to a market economy began in 1990, but was severely curtailed by a range of 
external shocks which reduced the effect of domestic policy changes. Between 1989 and 1991 
Soviet aid was reduced and then terminated, and trading with CMEA countries collapsed. 
Mongolia lost its main export market, its secure supply of imports (especially oil) and 
favourable terms of trade (UNDP 1994, Lee 1993). 
This led to a fall in the value of exports, and a severe reduction in foreign exchange earnings. 
A 2.1 percent decline in GDP in 1990 was followed by a further decline of 18 percent in 1991. 
Falling output led to domestic shortages of fuel and spare parts, disrupting the transportation 
system and leading to difficulties in the procurement and distribution of food. This situation 
was further compounded by the maintenance of artificially low state procurement prices for 
livestock and livestock products which were unable to compete with the rising free market 
prices offered by private traders (Lee 1994). 
These events plus liberalisation of the exchange rate and removal of price controls for goods 
and services, led to rapid inflation, rising prices, unemployment and increasing poverty.3 In 
1991 the consumer price index rose by 54.3 percent, in 1992 by 321.1 percent and by a further 
193 percent in 1993 (UNDP 1994). Average output and incomes declined by 5 percent in 
1990, 8.3 percent in 1992 and a further 2.6 percent in 1993; across the period as a whole this 
amounts to a decline in average income by a quarter (UNDP 1994). 
Severe constraints were placed on the governments ability to continue to finance the health, 
education and social security sectors, and there were declining real expenditures in all three 
areas. Between 1991 and 1992 for example, expenditures in the health sector fell from 5.1 to 
2.9 percent of GDP, in education from 10.2 percent to 5.3 percent and in social security from 
4.5 percent to 1.8 percent of GDP (UNICEF 1993). The real value of wages declined. 
Although real wages in the state sector rose eightfold between 1991 and 1994, they were not 
able to keep in line with the twenty fold increase in consumer prices over the same period. 
Unemployment has risen dramatically since 1989 and stood at 8 percent of the labour force at 
the end of 1993. This is largely attributed to the falling numbers of jobs in state enterprises, 
Other factors are also considered to have contributed to this situation, including economic 
mismanagement and the ill-judged sequencing of key reforms (UNDP 1994). 
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and although employment in the private sector has continued to grow this has not kept up with 
labour demand (UNDP 1994). 
The extent of poverty 
In 1989 there was no official poverty in Mongolia. By 1992 the poor comprised 17 percent of 
the population; by the end of 1993 they were 24 percent of the population, made up of 21 
percent poor and three percent very poor. The latest figures in June 1994 stated that 26 
percent of the population were in poverty (Government of Mongolia 1994). The poor are 
evenly divided between urban and rural areas: 49.9 percent of poor households live in urban 
areas and 50.1 percent live in rural areas. Under this distinction the urban areas comprise the 
capital Ulaanbaatar, and the two other major cities, Darkhan and Erdenet, while the rural areas 
comprise the remaining population of the eighteen aimags. 
Those officially categorised as poor are those households whose per capita income is below 40 
percent of the monthly minimum wage, set at Tug 5,019 (US$12.5) at the end of 1993. The 
poverty line was set at Tug 3200 (US$8) for urban and Tug 2900 (US$7.2) for rural areas 
(UNDP 1994). The poverty line or minimum living level (MLL) is based on an individual's 
ability to gain access to a bundle of goods to satisfy basic needs. These include food, shelter, 
clothing, heating, household goods, medical supplies and school books. Norms calculated for 
each item are based on market prices. 
The way the poverty line is measured may obscure the actual levels of urban and rural poverty. 
First, the rural poverty line is much lower than the urban one, on the grounds that rural 
households consume their own animal products, more than compensating the reduced access 
to many goods in rural areas. Poverty lines are revised upwards every few months to adjust for 
inflation but adjustments do not reflect the real rise in prices. Thus poverty levels are likely to 
be underestimated generally, and rural poverty to be underestimated in relation to urban 
poverty (UNDP 1994). 
While employing an income based poverty line, the government has also identified categories 
of vulnerable groups who are likely to be especially vulnerable to poverty. These include 
orphans, those with disabilities, the elderly, the unemployed, female-headed households, 
households with many dependents. Women and children especially form a significant category 
of the poor; at the end of 1993 21.5 percent of poor households were female-headed and 25 
percent of poor households had more than four children under sixteen. Over 54 per ecent of 
the registered unemployed are women. Importantly, these categories do not include herding 
households with few livestock who are especially vulnerable to economic and climatic risks 
but who are not at present considered especially vulnerable. 
The emergence of rural poverty 
Poverty has always existed in the Mongolian pastoral economy. In the pre-collective period, 
prior to the 1950s, wealth differentials between herding households were high. Society was 
organised along feudal lines with a very uneven distribution of livestock between rich and 
poor. Humphrey (1978) notes that in Tsetsenkahn aimag in 1890, feudal lords owned an 
average of 230.8 head of livestock while personal serfs had an average of 3.3 head of 
livestock. Poor households often were forced into labour relationships with richer households 
to survive; herding their livestock in exchange for the consumption of livestock products. 
During the collective period, wealth differences between herders certainly existed, but were 
less marked as limits on private livestock holdings were enforced until the mid 1980s. 
Different economic entities imposed different limits; members of state farms were allowed 
fewer private animals than members of collectives although all the limits were often exceeded 
(PALD 1993b). Salary ranges also ensured differentiation among households. Herders were 
rewarded for their herding skill and paid salaries according to the total number of animals and 
type of species herded. Large animals (cattle, horses, camels) were usually allocated to the 
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most skilled (and usually the most wealthy) herders. In Tariat sum, Arkhangai for example, 
annual salaries ranged from 6,000 tugriks for a seasonal milking worker to between 10,000 
and 20,000 tugriks for permanent herders. The largest salaries went to those with the biggest 
herds and to those who best met or surpassed production quotas (personal communication, 
ex-negdel chief, Tariat sum, Arkhangai, 1993). 
While this did create differences between households, all herders were protected from 
extreme poverty by allocation of animals from the collective, and by the range of subsidies and 
benefits the collective was able to provide. The change from collective to private ownership of 
livestock however has created the potential for an increase in poverty and vulnerability among 
the rural population. There are a number of reasons for this including the nature of the 
privatisation process itself, the wider reform process, the increase in individual risk and the fall 
in levels of service provision to the herding population. 
The privatisation process. At the end of the collective period over 70 percent of livestock 
were owned by collectives, ten percent by state organisations and around 20 percent by 
private individuals. Following the privatisation of livestock beginning in 1991, it is estimated 
that around 75 percent of Mongolia's total head of livestock of 20 million animals were under 
private ownership by 1993 (Mearns 1993) and this rose to around 90 percent by late 1994. 
Despite adherence to general guidelines, individual collectives were given considerable 
freedom in determining the nature of privatisation. The emphasis was on rewarding those 
whose contribution to the collective was highest. Households could be rewarded according to 
the following criteria: (i) the number of animals a person contributed from their private herd 
at the time of collectivisation; (ii) the number of years the household had been members of the 
collective; (iii) the contribution a person made to the collective. This allowed exacerabation of 
existing inequalities within the collective system. For example, those judged to have 
contributed the most were more likely to be those who had been responsible for the largest 
herds and had the highest incomes. The wealth of individual collectives also determined the 
number of animals received by different households; members of rich collectives received 
many more than members of poor ones. It is also likely that the allocation of livestock took 
place more equitably in some areas than in others. Evidence from some aimags suggests that 
some gender discrimination in the allocation of livestock occurred, with women being 
allocated less valuable stock than men (PALD 1993b). 
The economic reform process. The privatisation of livestock also took place within a wider 
sequence of reforms, the timing of which has not resulted in a smooth economic transition in 
the rural areas. The decision to privatise livestock ahead of the development of input and 
output markets meant that adequate marketing channels and incentives for increased 
production were not been developed and herders were faced with initially a hostile marketing 
environment as well as a greater degree of risk (UNDP 1994). 
The most significant aspect of the reform process has been the maintenance of poor terms of 
trade for livestock and livestock products; these have, in fact, worsened since privatisation. 
There was a significant lag in the liberalisation of livestock product prices which took place in 
1993, compared with the liberalisation of prices for consumer and other goods such as flour, 
rice and sugar which took place from 1991 onwards (Edstrom 1993). The effect was to 
constrain market development and effectively reduce market participation by herders (Edstrom 
1993). The immediate response of herders was to retreat into self-provisioning (Cooper and 
Gelezhamtsin 1993) and barter exchange of livestock products rather than live animals for 
basic goods (Edstrom 1993). This has had a particular impact on poorer sections of the rural 
population who have less flexibility in marketing than richer ones and less opportunities to 
resort to self-provisioning. 
The increase in individual risk. The emergence of rural poverty is likely also to be linked to 
the increased level of risk faced by rural households. Before privatisation the main risks of 
herding were carried by the collectives who provided herders with guarenteed incomes, free 
fodder, transport and veterinary services which effectively protected herders from a range of 
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risks such as extreme winter conditions, animal disease, drought and genuine hardship. In 
addition, herders in more marginal environments like the Gobi were given additional incomes 
to compensate for the harsh herding environment. Now all these risks (plus the additional risk 
of market failure) has been placed on the individual herder. 
Falling service provision. The rural population has also been severely affected by rising 
unemployment and the contraction of public service provision which have contributed to an 
increase in poverty. Despite an increase of 400,000 herders following livestock privatisation, 
unemployment in rural areas is estimated to be between 15 and 20 percent of the population 
compared with 4-5 percent of the population in Ulaanbaatar (UNDP 1994). 
The level of education provision in rural areas was impressive under the collectives, with a 
very high level of school enrolment and literacy among herding children. The education budget 
was cut by 69 percent between 1990 and 1992, leading to some cost recovery and the closure 
of boarding houses for rural children. Enrolment rates for grades 1-3 have fallen from 100 
percent in 1989 to 74 percent in 1992 (UNDP 1994) with rural areas particularly affected as 
children are withdrawn from school to help with herding. 
Health service provision has also been severely affected. Under the collectives, a wide range of 
primary health care, and ante- and post-natal services were delivered at sum and bag level. 
Since 1989 the number of maternity homes for women have been reduced from 287 to 52, 
resulting in more home deliveries, and a possible increase in the maternal mortality rate 
(Randall 1993). The rate is much higher in rural than urban areas with 23 deaths per 10,000 
live births in the aimags compared with 13 in the cities. There has also been a decline in the 
number of patients treated and admitted for hospital care. Shortages of drugs, transport and 
other resources are seen as reasons for this decline in services (UNDP 1994). 
The rural population has also been affected in other ways. Already isolated physically by 
limited road and rail links, communication difficulties have been exacerbated by rising fuel 
prices and shortages of spare parts as well as a concentration of vehicle ownership and access 
in the hands of a few officials and individuals at the time of privatisation. 
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4. THE CHANGING HERDING ENVIRONMENT 
The herding environment has changed considerably in Mongolia in the last few years. The 
most important changes have been the transfer of livestock ownership from collective to 
private hands, and the change in the way goods and services are owned and distributed to 
herding households. The most significant of these changes - the privatisation of livestock - has 
taken place differently in different regions. In some areas herders have become fully private, 
belonging to no particular organisation, in others they remain members of companies and have 
benefits and responsibilities similar to those in the collective. The three sums studied reflect 
these differences and different patterns of wealth and poverty have emerged as a result. Each 
sum is discussed in turn. 
Table 2. Summary information, sample sums, 1992 
Livestock 
Sum & Population Land Privately Company State 
Province Area (ha) Owned Owned Owned 
Tariat 5,599 465,000 95,269 90 755 
Arkhangai 
Kharkhorin 14,900 233,000 74,830 38,262 10,347 
Ovorkhangai 
Bayan- 3,400 500,000 102,000 38,000 0 
Tsagaan, 
Bayankhonger 
Source: Sum statistics 
Tariat sum, Arkhangai 
Tariat sum lies in the mountain-steppe zone of Arkhangai aimag, to the north of the Khangai 
mountain range. It is an area of forests, deep mountain valleys and relatively large areas of 
high quality open pasture. Mountains rise to over 3000 metres above sea level. In 1992 it had 
a population of 5,599, just over a quarter of whom live in the sum centre. 
Privatisation of livestock took place between October 1991 and October 1992. Over 99 
percent of livestock are now privately owned by individual households. The predominant 
species herded are goats and sheep, cattle (including yak) and some horses. 
Herders are largely independent although some herders have contracts with the ex-negdel 
Gerelt Zam livestock company to supply meat products to the company on a regular basis. 
The negdel was dissolved in early 1992 and is now a company responsible for the marketing of 
herders livestock products. 
Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai 
Kharkhorin sum is situated in the central forest-steppe zone of Mongolia and is an area of high 
quality pasture characterised by broad river valleys and rolling hills. The sum is the site of an 
ex-state farm with some 31,800 ha of crop land largely devoted to wheat production, 8,200 ha 
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of forest and 178,600 ha of natural pasture. The main species herded are sheep, cattle and 
horses with only a small number of goats. 
In June 1992 the state farm was divided into four shareholding companies. Kharkhorin 
company has 70 percent state ownership as controller of the state owned irrigation system. 
The majority of shareholders in the other companies are company employees who invested 
their privatisation vouchers in the companies (Edstrom 1993). 
Most livestock (61 percent in 1992) are now privately owned by indivduals, while 31 percent 
were owned by companies and 8.4 percent by state organisations. Company livestock are 
leased to individual company members who herd animals for a salary and are required to fulfill 
individual production quotas on cashmere, wool or milk. Herders are fined if quotas are not 
met while surplus production may be sold privately. This closely follows the old negdel 
economic model. 
Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor 
Bayan Tsagaan sum lies in the mid-west of Bayankhongor aimag in the semi-arid Gobi zone. 
Bayan Tsagaan sum has a population of 3,400 and a total of 140,000 livestock, of which 27.1 
percent were owned by the ex-negdel livestock company in 1992. The rest were owned 
privately by individual herders or by small private economic units. 
The process of privatisation in Bayan Tsagaan sum appears unusual compared with other areas 
studied by PALD. In January 1991 the negdel sold off its large animal stock of camels, cattle 
and horses to herders. Households were allocated large animals according to the number of 
negdel members within the household. Each adult was given the equivalent of 0.5 camels, 0.5 
horses and 1/10th of a cow. According to sum officials herders paid for livestock in cash or in 
kind (with livestock products). 
At the same time the negdel entered into a lease agreement with herders for the herding of 
negdel small stock of sheep and goats. Between January 1991 and September 1993 herders 
leased sheep and goats at a fixed rate of 19 tg per sheep and 43 tg per goat. Each household 
was allocated 23 sheep and goats per person. Herders continued to supply livestock products 
from these animals to the negdel, but all offspring were kept by the herders. In September 
1993, herders used their privatisation vouchers to purchase leased animals from the company, 
by then a shareholding company. 
Access to inputs and services following privatisation 
The livestock, health and education services provided to the herding community in the past 
have been severely reduced both by the privatisaton process itself, as well as budgetary 
constraints which have reduced the level of service provision in the rural areas. 
The kind of livestock services (fodder and hay, transport) available to herders following 
privatisation varies across individual sums. It depends to a large extent on the level of private 
livestock ownership in the sum and the amount of control retained by ex-negdel livestock 
companies following privatisation. 
In Tariat sum, Arkhangai, where all livestock are privately owned, the role of Gerelt Zam 
livestock company is confined to the purchasing and marketing of herders' livestock products. 
It provides little in the way of services or input provision. In Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai, 
where company ownership and control is high, access to key inputs and services has been well 
maintained although services are sometimes erratic. In Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, 
herders are relying increasingly on their own means to get transport and other services. 
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Although they are an essential input for livestock production, purchased inputs of fodder and 
hay are not high among herders' priorities in the post-collective period. In areas like Tariat 
sum, Arkhangai, where subsidised inputs are no Ionger available, herders rely on supplies of 
reasonably plentiful hand-cut hay to meet requirements for supplementary winter feed. They 
have also developed collective means of organising the cutting and collecting of hay. In 
Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai, companies continue to provide fodder and hay freely to their 
members and herders seldom purchase additional fodder and hay themselves. In Bayan 
Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, where households leased livestock up until September 1993, 
herders bought fodder and hay at reduced price from the company for both leased and private 
animals. Most households interviewed had bought a small amount of fodder and hay for their 
animals before the winter of 1992 although one of the poorest households cut hay by hand 
themselves, During the Dzud of March 1993 herders received some fodder and hay free from 
the State Emergency Fodder Fund and made additional purchases themselves. 
Access to transport, mainly to move camp, appears to vary between sums. In Tariat sum, 
Arkhangai where vehicles are available to herders but at high cost, herders use their own 
draught animal transport, sharing animals for this purpose. Collective arrangements for moving 
camp and other transport needs are well developed and discussed in Part 8. In Kharkhorin 
sum, Ovorkhangai such collective cooperation is less well developed since the livestock 
companies provide free transport for camp moves twice a year. At other times herders pay the 
company or move themselves using borrowed animals. On occasions when the system is not 
operating effectively (for example when the companies have limited petrol), herders do not 
always respond with their own collective action, sometimes delaying or putting off moves 
altogether. 
In Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, all herders in theory have free access to their share of 
privatised vehicles. In practice all but very wealthy herders appear to rely on draught animals 
to move camp and other transport needs. Given the high concentration of draught animals 
among the wealthiest households in this area, this has particular implications for poorer 
herders who often have to borrow animals to move camp, and for herding and making trips to 
the sum centre. 
Health and education 
Health service provision has been reduced in all three areas but most drastically in Tariat sum, 
Arkhangai. Electricity cuts through most of the winter of 1993 meant virtual closure of the 
sum centre hospital, with the majority of patients treated at home. Staff have been cut by a 
third and health workers have access to only one vehicle for sum and bag visits. 
Health provision has been best maintained in Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai. Staff report no 
staff cuts; one doctor is responsible for 180-230 households and the service as a whole has 
access to four vehicles. Patients pay a small set charge for treatment at hospital with some 
exceptions. In Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, more regular visits to herders, vaccination 
programmes and health checks for pregnant women have been maintained. The sum has 
introduced some charges for patients admitted to the sum hospital. 
Education directors in all three sums reported falling attendance rates following privatisation, 
largely because herding households are withdrawing school age children because of rising 
costs and increased labour needs in herding. Although data are limited, household interviews 
suggest that drop-out rates are not higher among poorer households. Table 3 shows school 
attendance levels for the three sums studied. 
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Table 3. School attendance by sum, 1993-94 
Sum & Aimag No of School Age 
Children 7 - 18 
Numbers 
Attending 
Percent 
Tariat, 
Arkhangai 
1357 706 52.0 
Kharkhorin, 
Ovorkhangai 
3062 1266 73.4 
Bayan-Tsagaan, 
Bayankhongor 
700 503 72.0 
Source: Sum statistics 
In Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai attendance rates are reasonably high (73.4 percent). This is 
possibly due to the fact that children of herding households have greater opportunities to 
travel to and from school using vehicles provided by livestock companies. Education officers 
in Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor reported an attendance rate of around 72 percent 
compared with a figure of 95 percent during the negdel period. Falling attendance rates among 
herding households were attributed to the lack of vehicle transport for children to travel to and 
from school, and the withdrawal of free meals for boarding children. The two sum dormitories 
which previously housed 300 pupils are now closed, and the 105 boarders from herding 
families now stay with sum centre relatives. The attendance figures for Tariat sum, Arkhangai 
appear very low, particularly since this figure includes some 63 pupils attending a local bag 
centre school. A number of herders move camps close to the bag centre during the school 
term so that their children can live at home while attending school. These households place 
most of their animals in the care of relatives living away from the bag centre at these times. 
In some aimags education officials have begun to introduce some cost recovery into the 
system, and some aimags such as Khovd and Gobi-Altai now charge school fees for pupils. 
Only limited costs are recovered in the three areas studied: for example in Kharkhorin sum, 
Ovorkhangai, boarding pupils now pay 50 percent of food costs. This has resulted in some 
reduction in the numbers of boarders. The school itself raises 20 percent of its salary budget 
through sales of livestock products. 
Faced with falling attendance rates and rising costs of static sum based education services, 
some areas have begun to introduce distance learning education. One such experimental 
programme is developing in Tariat sum Arkhangai, for 1st to 6th grade pupils currently not 
attending school. 
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S. WEALTH DIFFERENTIATION IN THE HERDING ECONOMY 
Livestock ownership 
Ownership of livestock and household herd size is the most significant way in which herding 
communities differentiate between rich and poor. The same is true for Mongolia although 
average herd sizes differ in different areas. 
Differences in the size of livestock holdings between the three sums, shown in table 4, reflect 
regional differences in pasture quality, and differences resulting from policies during the 
collective period. In Tariat sum, Arkhangai where pasture quality and herd productivity is 
high, average herds are around 70 animals per household. In Bayan Tsagaan, Bayankhongor 
where the natural environment is more risky and herd productivity lower, herds are larger. 
This may be a hangover from the policy of subsidising poorer areas during the collective 
period, leaving more animals to distribute at the time of privatisation of collective assets. In 
Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai the natural environment is good but the smaller average herd 
size reflects the high proportion of company livestock which households have and the limits on 
private livestock holdings by state farm households during the collective period. 
Table 4. Patterns of livestock ownership, 1992-3, by sum 
Tariat, 
Arkhangai 
Kharkhorin, 
Ovorkhangai 
Bayan Tsagaan, 
Bayankhongor 
No of households 159 135 165 
Total private livestock 11,169 7,392 22,484 
Household average 70.2 54.8 136,3 
Standard deviation 36.4 38.3 108.7 
Range 8-175 5-242 0-605 
Average leased 0 103.6 56.9 
livestock per household 
Source: Sum statistics 
NB. Figures for leased livestock are based on interview sample rather than bag statistics. All 
other figures are based on bag statistics. The average number of leased livestock is included 
for Bayan Tsagaan, Bayankhongor since lease agreements were in place during the period 
from which this livestock data dates. It should be noted however that leasing of livestock 
stopped in this sum in September 1993. 
(i) Household herd sizes 
The distribution of herd size by individual household is difficult to assess. Table 5 gives an 
estimate of the national herd size distribution by household in 1992. It shows that 59 percent 
of households have fewer than 50 animals and 19 percent less than ten animals. These figures 
are very general however, and therefore not a particularly reliable indicator of increasing 
patterns of wealth differentiation. They include both urban and rural households and therefore 
include households whose predominant source of income is not from herding. Neither do they 
take into account herd composition, household size or regional differences in herd size. 
( 
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Table 5. Herd size distribution, Mongolia, 1992 
Herd size Households 
(Number of animals) (Percent of total 
<10 19 
11-30 23 
31-50 17 
51-100 22 
101-200 14 
201-500 5 
501-1000 0.1 
Source: UNDP 1994 
Data from the three sums studied do not show such extreme patterns of wealth differentiation 
but may more accurately reflect the situation among herding households. Of the 459 
households from the three sums studied 15.3 percent had 30 animals or less, while 35.3 
percent had 50 animals or less; 2.4 percent had 10 animals or less. Although official estimates 
of what constitutes a minimum herd size differ from region to region (from 30 animals in 
Tariat sum to 100 animals in Bayan Tsagaan sum) these figures show that one third of 
households in the sample have less than fifty animals. 
Table 6. Herd size distribution in sample sums, 1993 
Percent of households with herds of different size in: 
Herd size Bayan Tsagaan, Tariat, Arkhangai Kharkhorin, 
(Number of Bayankhongor Ovorkhangai 
animals) 
<10 6.1 0.6 3.7 
11-30 4.2 11.3 21.5 
31-50 7.8 22.6 29.0 
51-100 25.5 44.7 31.9 
101-200 39.4 20.8 34.8 
201-500 15.2 0.0 7.4 
501-1000 1.8 0.0 0.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(n) 165 159 135 
Source: Sum statistics 
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(ii) Livestock ownership and wealth status 
Interviews with herders show that household herd size is, for them, the primary factor defining 
wealth status. Regression analysis of wealth ranking data in two of the three areas suggests 
that there is some relationship between perceived wealth status and size of household herds: in 
both areas household herd size explains 40 percent of household wealth status. This means 
that 60 percent of any individual household's wealth rank is explained by other factors such as 
alternative sources of income, herding skill or age. 
In order to compare data across the three sample areas it was decided to use private livestock 
holdings expressed in traditional livestock units (bod) rather than wealth ranks in order to 
stratify households on the basis of wealth4 households were ranked in this way using the most 
recently available bag statistics which give details of each household's private livestock 
holdings. The households in each bag were then divided into four equal wealth quartiles with 
quartile 1 being the richest and quartile 4 being the poorest. Table 7 shows patterns of 
livestock ownership in each wealth quartile by sum. 
The greatest differences in livestock holdings are between households in Bayan Tsagaan sum, 
Bayankhongor where the poorest 25 percent of households own only 5 percent of livestock 
and the richest 25 percent of households own 52 percent of livestock. The smallest difference 
between groups is in Tariat sum Arkhangai where the richest own 42 percent of total livestock 
in the bag and the poorest 11 percent. Up until September 1993, however, the differentiation 
in private livestock holdings in Bayan Tsagaan was to some extent reduced by leased holdings. 
The greatest range in the total number of private animals per household again is in Bayan 
Tsagaan (a range of 0-107.9 bod of livestock per household, compared with 3-86.9 bod of 
livestock for households in Kharkhorin and 2.9-96.2 in Tariat). The figure of 0 was recorded 
for some households who, at the time bag data were collected, were without private livestock 
holdings and herded only leased livestock (sheep and goats). 
4. A bod is made up of 0.7 camel, 1 horse, 1 cattle, 7 sheep of ten goats. 
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Table 7. Distribution of total private livestock holdings expressed in traditional 
livestock units (bod) by wealth quartile 
Tariat, 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Arkhangai Total Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile 
Total 5605.8 2339.3 15771.1 1082.8 606.6 
% of Total 100 41.7 28.1 19.3 10.8 
Average 35.3 60 39.4 54.0 15.2 
Std. Dev. 17.8 11.3 4.3 9.3 4.7 
Range 2.9-96.2 48-96.2 33-47.5 36-74.0 2.9-21.1 
Livestock 
per person 10.3 12.8 10.1 10.4 7.9 
Kharkhorin, 1st 2nd 3 rd 4th 
Arkhangai Total Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartil 
Total 3079.1 1445.1 775 550.7 308.3 
% of Total 100 46.9 25.2 17. 10.0 
Average 22.8 43.8 22.8 16.2 9.1 
Std. Dev. 14.7 13.6 2.7 1.4 2.4 
Range 3-86.9 28.2-86.9 18.6-27.5 13.8-18.4 3-13.7 
Livestock 
Per Person 7.6 12.4 8.5 5.8 3.6 
Bayan 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Tsagaan, Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile 
Ovorkhangai Total 
Total 4394.1 2273.7 1185.3 696.2 238.9 
% of Total 100 51.7 27.0 15.8 5.4 
Average 26.6 55.5 28.2 16.6 6.0 
Std. Dev. 21.3 20.9 4.3 2.6 4.2 
Range 0-107.9 34.8-107.9 21.3-34.3 12.9-21.2 0-12.3 
Livestock 
Per Person 8.2 13.2 9.9 5.4 3.6 
Note: For bod see text 
Source: Sum statistics 
(Hi) Herd structure and wealth status 
The proportion of households with a mixed species herd increases markedly with wealth, 
suggesting that richer households have a greater capacity for risk spreading. Table 8 shows the 
proportion of households herding all types of animals in the sample sums. 
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Table 8. Proportion of households owning all species of livestock by sum 
Sum No. of 
Species 
Herded 
Percentage Of Each Quartile Herding All Types 
1 
Richest 
4 
Poorest 
Tariat, 4 
Arkhangai 
Kharkhorin, 5 
Ovorhangai 
Bayan 5 
Tsagaan, 
Bayan-
khongor 
92.3 
36.4 
93.0 
90.0 
2.9 
45.2 
90.0 
8.8 
33.3 
45.0 
0.0 
2.4 
Source: Sum statistics 
In Tariat sum, Arkhangai, where all species except camels are herded, 90 percent of the richest 
three quartiles, and 45 percent of the poorest quartile own all four types of animals. In 
Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai, where ownership of camels is limited mainly to the wealthiest 
group of households, only 36 percent of the richest quartile and none of the poorest herd all 
species. In Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, again the difference between rich and poor is 
marked, with 93 percent of the richest quartile but only 2 percent of the poorest quartile 
owning all five species. 
The uneven distribution of species between wealth quartiles means that certain types of stock 
are more concentrated in the hands of wealthier households.5. Across the sample as a whole, 
the richest quartile owns between 40 and 70 percent of large stock and around 40 percent of 
small stock. In Tariat sum, Arkhangai there is a more even distribution of species between 
wealth quartiles compared to the other two sums. 
In Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai there is a big difference in the proportion of large stock 
owned by different wealth quartiles with the richest quartile owning 78 percent of camels 
compared with 0 percent for the poorest quartile. In Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor the 
distribution of species between wealth quartiles is more uneven than in the other two areas 
with the poorest quartile owning on average 0 percent of camels and 8 percent of sheep 
compared with 6 percent of camels and 12 percent of sheep in Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai 
and 10 percent of camels and 11 percent of sheep in Tariat sum, Arkhangai. 
Live animal sales 
Annual live animal sales for fifty sample households from the three sample sums were 
examined for the period October/November 1992 to October/November 1993, Average 
annual livestock sales per household are similar in Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor (4,8) 
and Tariat sum, Arkhangai (3.7) but much lower in Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai, where the 
Appendix 1 shows average private livestock holdings by species for each sample sum. 
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average is 0.6. These figures are likely to be explained by the existence of company salaries 
and smaller private herds in Kharkhorin and the larger herds in Bayan Tsagaan and good 
market access in Tariat. 
Table 9. Average annual live animal sales per household by sum (50 households) 
Sum Sample Total Large Small 
Size Number Sold Stock Stock 
Tariat, 15 3.7 2.2 1.7 
Arkhangai 
Kharkhorin, 14 0.6 0.4 0.2 
Ovorkhangai 
Bayan 21 4.8 0.2 4.5 
Tsagaan, 
Bayankhongor 
Source: 50 household survey 
The 50 households sampled had sold a total of 165 animals or an average of 3.3 per 
household. However, of the fifty housholds, 19 had sold no animals at all. This is largely the 
result of the trend for households to withdraw from livestock sales where possible given 
current market conditions which are not in their favour.6 Of these 19, four were in the richest 
quartile, three in the middle two quartiles and nine in the poorest quartile. However there is 
no linear relationship between sales of live animals and household wealth status. Data from 50 
households from the three sample sums suggests that households from the middle two wealth 
quartiles (2 and 3) make proportionately slightly higher sales of livestock than households in 
the top and bottom two wealth quartiles. This supports the findings of recent research that 
middle wealth households are more likely to sell live animals than richer or poorer households 
(Edstrom 1994). 
Table 10. Annual average live animal sales by wealth group (50 households) 
Live Animal 
Sales 
1 
Richest 
Quartile 
2 3 4 
Poorest 
Large Stock 1.4 1.5 1.6 0.7 
Small Stock 2.1 4.1 1.7 1.1 
Total 3.5 5.6 4.1 1.3 
Source: 50 household survey 
6. See Edstrom (1994) for a detailed discussion on this point. 
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Vfarketing decisions 
Live animals are sold or exchanged in order to acquire basic goods such as flour and rice. In 
nost cases studied these were barter exchanges. Of the fifteen households in the Tariat sum 
sample, 4 had sold no animals and were in two cases poorer households with no animals to 
sell. Of the 12 who had sold animals, this was to secure access to basic goods or cash to 
purchase them with. The majority also had a contract with the Gere It Zam livestock company 
which provided easy access to basic goods. The large number of households with contracts 
with the company is the main reason for the number of sales in Tariat sum, Arkhangai. 
In Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai sales of live animals are much lower as households can, for 
the most part, rely on company salaries and pensions to buy basic goods which are more 
regularly available through the company. None of the poorer households in the sample had 
sold any animals for this reason. Of the fourteen household samples in Kharkhorin, 10 
households had sold at least one live animal over the one year period, five had sold none. 
Larger households particularly tend to sell animals so that they can purchase flour and other 
goods in large amounts. Richer households in both Tariat sum and Kharkhorin sum made sales 
in order to acquire goods other than basic necessities including expensive one-off items such 
as ger covers and tarpaulins. 
Live animal sales by all households are likely to increase in the future. Households in 
Kharkhorin sum particularly, stated that rising prices and the ending of ration allowances for 
flour and other goods in the middle of 1993 meant an increase in the need to exchange animals 
for goods. Already small stock are being exchanged for large amounts of a single good - for 
example a single sheep is exchanged for 70 kilos of flour or 500 candles. In Kharkhorin sum, 
Ovorkhangai households stated that the distance of their camps from the sum centre meant 
that goods have to be bought in large quantities each time to offset the costs of taking 
transport to the sum centre and the time taken to make the trip. This means that live animals 
are often the only means of exchange. Households stated that the need to sell live animals for 
goods is less pressing during periods such as spring and summer, when salaries increase during 
the lambing and milking seasons. 
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6. INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
The composition of rural household monetary income has changed considerably over time. 
Between 1986-89 on average salaries made up 74.5 percent of rural household cash income 
with income from private sales amounting to 14.5 percent; pensions and benefits were 7.6 
percent, other negdel sources (such as prizes and bonuses) 2.1 percent, and other income 
(gifts etc.) 1.3 percent. By 1993, salaries were only 23.9 percent of average household income 
and products sales were as much as 44.6 percent (see table 11). 
Table 11. Composition of average household monthly cash income, Mongolia, 1986-
1993 (percent) 
Income source 1986-9 Nov. 1992 Nov. 1993 
Salary & Bonuses 76.6 35.2 23.9 
Pensions & . 7.6 8.8 11.7 
Benefits 
Product Sales 14.5 41.6 44.6 
Other 1.3 14.4 20.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: State Statistical Office. 
Data from PALD research going back to 1990 shows income from product sales rising from 
around 14 percent of household monetary income during the negdel period to around 80 
percent of household income in 1993, almost double that of the State Statistical Office (SSO) 
data (See Appendix 2). This is perhaps explained by the fact that these data are derived from 
sums where herders are fully private; there are no lease agreements in effect and no salaries are 
paid to the majority of herders. In an area where salaries remain important, such as Kharkhorin 
sum, Ovorkhangai, income from product sales amounts to 39.6 percent and salaries 45.6 
percent, of monetary income. 
All these data refer to monetaiy income only. When own consumption is included, the 
proportion of household income derived from livestock products and salaries is reduced, with 
income from products produced and consumed within the household forming around a quarter 
of total household income. 
Household incomes and expenditures 
Patterns of household income and expenditure were examined for a total of 42 households in 
order to identify how far trends in the official data are mirrored by households in specific areas 
of the country. Given the small sample size, any conclusions made can only be tentative and 
illustrative of trends. 
In addition to data gathered from the three sample sums referred to throughout this paper 
(from which income and expenditive date were gathered in ten households), additional data 
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income and expenditure from 32 households from four other sums were used to increase the 
size and representation of the sample overall.7 
The breakdown of the total sample by region is as follows: 
Region Sum Aimag No. of Households 
Forest Tariat Arkhangai 4 
Steppe/Steppe Kharkhorin Ovorkhangai 3 
Altai Erdenburen Khovd 7 
Mountain-Gobi Tsogt Govi-Altai 5 
Bayan Tsagaan Bayankhongor 3 
Gobi Mandalavoo Omnogobi 10 
Desert-Steppe Erdene Dornogobi 10 
The sample size is not equal between regions and so there is some bias towards the Gobi sums 
which is reflected to some extent in the results . 
Household cash and barter incomes 
The composition of annual household cash and barter income was calculated using in depth 
interviews with 42 households distributed across different wealth groups in the six aimags 
listed above. Data were gathered for the same period in each area from June 1992-June 1993. 
The value of each household's income was divided by the number of household members to 
give the income per person for the household. 
Total household income is composed of the total value of all goods produced and consumed 
within the household as well as the value of products sold and exchanged. However, the 
figures here are calculated to show only the cash and barter income per person for each 
interviewed household. This is because own consumption data was available for only twenty 
of the forty-two sample households. The value of products processed and consumed within 
the household is hard to value accurately. On average, however, own consumption of 
livestock products formed an estimated 33.8 percent of household income for those twenty 
households, with this figure ranging from 11.5 percent to 47.5 percent of total income. These 
figures are based on information from twenty Gobi households where access to markets is 
good. It is likely that in more isolated areas own consumption of livestock products would 
form a higher proportion of household income. Data from other sums has shown that own 
consumption can form as much as 55 percent of total household income (PALD 1993b). 
i 
7. The data from the additional four sums (Erdenburen sum, Khovd; Tsogt sum, Gobi-Altai; 
Erdene sum, Dornogobi and Mandalavoo sum, Omnogobi) was gathered as part of the socio-
economic survey carried out for the Asian Development Bank Livestock Feed Improvement 
project by PALD between June and September 1993. (PALD 1993b). 
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Table 12. Average annual household cash and barter income 1992-93 (42 
households) 
Income Per H-hold Percent Per Person Percent 
Source Tg/Per Year of Total Tg/Per Year of Total 
Live Animals 21306.5 35.1 4496.9 35.5 
Livestock Prod. 
Total 23034.9 37.9 4613.1 36.5 
Milk Products 1116.9 1.8 196.7 1.6 
Wool & Hair 6579.2 10.8 1228.6 9.7 
Cashmere 14116.7 23.2 2964.3 23.4 
Hides & Skins 1222.1 2.0 223.5 1.8 
Salaries 5306.2 8.7 968.8 7.6 
Pensions/Benefits 7890.0 13.0 1960.0 15.5 
Aid/Assistance 457.8 0.8 69.4 0.5 
Other 2700.2 4.5 565.5 4.4 
Total 60695.6 100.0 12673.8 100.0 
Note: Other income largely constitutes gifts and loans from family and friends. It is likely that 
the proportion of income derived from these sources is underestimated in household reporting 
of income. 
Source: 42 household survey 
Household cash and barter income is dominated by sales of livestock products and live 
animals. Sales of livestock products are the largest single component (36.5 percent) with sales 
of live animals amounting to a fiither 35.5 percent. In total, sales of livestock and livestock 
products forms 72.0 percent of total household per person cash and barter income. Salaries, 
the main income source during collectivisation, are still significant for only two of the sums in 
the sample. Of the livestock products, cashmere is the most important, forming nearly a 
quarter of all per person household income. This is attributed partly to the high monetary 
value of cashmere compared with other livestock products, and also the significance of goat 
production to many of the households in the sample. Pensions and benefits are the third 
largest component of per person cash and barter income after cashmere and amount to 15.5 
percent. 
On average 27.4 percent of cash income is derived from the barter exchange of livestock 
products for basic foods such as flour and rice. The highest esimated figure for barter for a 
single household was 71.5 percent of monetary income but for most households the figure was 
lower. It is likely however that the proportion of income from barter exchange was 
underestimated by households in their reporting of household income. 
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Cash and barter income according to wealth status 
Average per person cash and barter income increases with wealth status. Table 13 shows that 
per person cash and barter income is around one third lower for the poorest group than the 
richest group.8 
Table 13. Average annual household cash and barter income (in tg) per person by 
wealth group 1992-93 (42 households) 
Wealth Group 
1 
(Richest) 
Wealth Group 
2 
Wealth Group Wealth Group 
3 4 
(Poorest) 
No. of 11 10 12 9 
households 
Live Animals 4964.0 4757.5 4114.4 4146,4 
Livestock 
Products 
Total 7035.9 6283.6 3076.8 1844.5 
Milk Products 311.8 52.4 225.3 178.0 
Wool/Hair 1253.7 2484.4 502.0 771.7 
Cashmere 5199.3 3529.5 2058.2 812.7 
Hides/Skins 271.1 217.3 291.3 82.1 
Salaries 872.5 353.3 1602.7 925.4 
Pensions/ 1161.2 3119.5 1218.0 2637.3 
Benefits 
Aid/Assistance 253.3 0.0 10.8 0.0 
Other 1105.0 179.4 573.7 324.1 
Total 15391.8 14693.2 10596.4 9877.9 
Note: Households were placed into wealth groups 1-4 based on the size of their private 
livestock holdings expressed in traditional livestock units or bod. 
Source: 42 household survey 
The average per person household income received from the sale of live animals is very similar 
in all four wealth groups. This suggests that in general households sell a minimum number of 
live animals to secure access to basic goods but that sales of live animals do not increase with 
increasing herd size or wealth status. However, the range of income from the sales of live 
8 This gap is much greater however if comparison is made between total household income 
(as opposed to per person household income). Total household income is on average twice as 
high in wealth group two as in wealth group four. Per person, households in wealth group 
one have the highest income, but per household, households in wealth group two have the 
highest overall income. The figures for income per household are shown in Appendix 3. 
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animals is large - ranging from 0 to 20,303 tugrik per person. Seven households in the sample 
had no income from live animals; four of these were from wealth group 3 and three from 
wealth group 4. 
Income from the sales of livestock products differs greatly between wealth groups. When 
added together the richest group earn nearly four times as much per person from livestock 
products as the poorest group. The richest group earn nearly twice as much income per person 
from the sale of milk products and wool and hair than the poorest group; over six times as 
much from sales of cashmere and three times as much from sales of hides and skins. Again if 
the figures per household rather than per person are considered we find that households in the 
second richest group receive the highest incomes from both sales of livestock and livestock 
products. Again this supports the idea that it is middle wealth households whose marketing 
incomes are likely to be the highest (Edstrom 1994). 
The data suggest that households sell a minimum number of animals to reach a target income 
needed to acquire a necessary quantity of goods. Differences in income from then on are 
based on sales of livestock products, the level of income earned being based on what can be 
produced and sold in relation to herd size and own consumption needs. 
In addition it appears that poorer households, in wealth groups 3 and 4, substitute income 
which is not earned by sales of livestock products with income from pensions and benefits and 
salaries. As Table 14 shows, the proportion of per person household income derived from 
salaries, pensions and benefits increases with poverty amounting to 11.9 percent of total cash 
income for the richest group and 36.1 percent of income for the poorest group. 
Importantly, therefore, the assumption that rural households can adapt to the changing 
economic situation (characterised by rising prices and the falling value of pensions and 
benefits) by increasing sales of livestock and livestock products is only true in the case of more 
wealthy households. The poorest households rely on pensions and salaries to supplement their 
income because sales of animals and products are necessarily low. 
31 
Table 14. Composition of average annual household monetary income (per person) 
by wealth group 1992-93 (42 households) (percent) 
Wealth Group 
1 
(Richest) 
Wealth Group 
2 
Wealth Group 
3 
Wealth Group 
4 
(Poorest) 
Live Animals 32.3 32.4 38.8 42.0 
Livestock 
Products 
Total 45.7 42.8 28.9 18.6 
of which: 
Milk Products 2.0 0.4 2.1 1.8 
Wool/Hair 8.1 16.9 4.7 7.8 
Cashmere 33.8 24.0 19.4 8.2 
Hides/Skins 1.8 1.5 2.7 0.8 
Salaries 5.7 2.4 15.1 9.4 
Pensions/ 7.5 21.2 11.5 26.7 
Benefits 
Aid/Assistance 1.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Other 7.2 1.2 5.4 3.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 
Source: 42 household survey 
Household income by region 
Regional differences in household income (shown in Tables 15 and 16) are based largely on 
the ecological potential of the region, herd size and structure, market access, features inherited 
from the collective period, and the form of economic organisation which has evolved 
following privatisation. 
In the Gobi desert region, high incomes from animal sales reflect good market access, large 
herds, and the absence of salaries for the majority of herders. The large numbers of sheep and 
goats in average herds is reflected in high incomes from sales of cashmere, wool and hair. The 
high market value of cashmere is one of the most important reasons why incomes in this 
region are so much higher overall. 
In the steppe region, smaller herds and the existence of salaries in Kharkhorin sum, Arkhangai, 
mean that overall income is lower and income from animal sales is limited as households only 
make animal sales to meet needs for basic goods. The small number of goats in the average 
herd means that income from cashmere sales is low, but the high levels of milk production are 
reflected in the highest income from the sale of milk products in this region. 
In the Altai region the situation is similar to the steppe zones. Overall incomes are low as this 
region is relatively isolated from markets and in one sum in the sample there is still some 
company ownership of livestock. 
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Table 15. Average annual household income per person by region, 1992-93 (tugrik) 
Gobi Steppe Altai 
Live Animals 8126.3 1136.4 1225.9 
Livestock Products 
Total 7139.1 1302.6 2802.5 
Milk Products 92.5 747.1 78.7 
Wool/Hair 2161.7 324.2 406.7 
Cashmere 4643.7 203.6 2025.6 
Hides/Skins 241.2 27.7 291.5 
Salaries 546.4 1007.2 1514.1 
Pensions/ 2063.4 760.2 2382.0 
Benefits 
Aid/Assistance 0.0 0.0 194.4 
Other 963.9 0.0 334.1 
Total 18803.1 4206.3 8452.9 
Source: 42 household survey 
Table 16. Composition of average annual household income per person by region 
1992-93 (percent) 
Gobi Steppe Altai 
No. of household 20 7 15 
Live Animals 43.2 27.0 14.5 
Livestock Products 
Total 37.9 31.0 33.1 
Milk Products 0.5 17.8 0.9 
Wool/Hair 11.5 7.7 4.8 
Cashmere 24.6 4.8 24.0 
Hides/Skins 1.3 0.7 3.4 
Salaries 2.9 23.9 17.9 
Pensions/Benefits 11.0 18.1 28.2 
Aid/Assistance 0.0 0.0 2.3 
Other 5.0 0.0 4.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: 42 household survey 
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Sales of live animals are much higher in the Gobi, which reflects large herds, and a continuing 
commitment to meat orders or state orders as under the collective; this contrasts with the 
other (wo regions where one sample sum in each region had some company ownership of 
livestock and regularly paid salaraies, meaning that sales of private animals were lower. In the 
Altai region, also, access to markets is more limited in the western and south western aimags 
than for example in the Gobi aimags where market access through China is well established. In 
the Altai region, two of the sample areas had suffered losses as a result of the 1993 dzud and 
this had substantially reduced their sales of live animals. 
Livestock products form a similar proportion of income for all three areas but this income is 
made up in different ways: in the mountain forest-steppe region largely by the seasonal sale of 
milk and milk products to organised dairies, and in the Gobi and Altai regions by the sale of 
cashmere. 
Household expenditure patterns 
Expenditure patterns of rural households have changed significantly as a result of economic 
liberalisation. State Statistical Office data (Table 17) show a significant increase in spending on 
food and a significant decrease in spending on non-food items. In 1993 there was a large 
increase in food expenditures compared with 1992. This increase is mainly the result of a 16 
percent increase in expenditure on flour, explained by rising prices and by the level of barter 
exchange taking place in the rural areas - livestock products are exchanged for flour more than 
any other product. The PALD data for 1993 shows food expenditure to be an even higher 
proportion of average household expenditure, amounting to 55.4 percent of the total with 33.7 
percent going on flour (table 18). 
Table 17. Composition of average household monthly expenditure, Mongolia, 1986-
1993 (percent) 
1986-89 1992 1993 
Food 
Non-Food 
Services 
Savings 
29.0 
55.0 
5.4 
5.7 
4.9 
100.0 
41.0 
50.6 
6.3 
2.1 
51.4 
39.9 
6.9 
1.8 
Loans 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: State Statistical Office 
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Table 18. Average annual household expenditure 1992-1993 (42 households) 
(Tugrik/percent) 
Household Per Per Person Per 
Average Cent Average Cent 
Flour 16371.8 33.7 3174.5 32.8 
Rice 4868.9 10.0 985.1 10.2 
Tea 2420.5 5.0 449.2 4.6 
Sugar 920.8 1.9 210.7 2.2 
Sweets 649.6 1.3 148.3 1.5 
Vegetables 65.5 0.1 10.7 0.1 
Vodka & Tobacco 1658.3 3.4 310.1 3.2 
Total Food 26955.4 55.4 5288.6 54.6 
Household Goods 1794.4 3.7 363.7 3.8 
Clothing & Boots 6834.9 14.1 1407.6 14.6 
Human Health 816.5 1.7 100.7 1.1 
Animal Health 182.4 0.4 41.4 0.4 
Fodder and Hay 1465.0 3.1 316.9 3.3 
Animal Tax 1067.1 2.2 186.9 1.9 
Other 9425.0 19.4 1962.9 20.3 
Total Non Food 21585.3 44.6 4380.1 45.4 
Overall Total 48540.7 100.0 9668.7 100.0 
Source: 42 household survey 
Just over half of average household expenditure is on food products (including vodka and 
tobacco) of which the most is spent on flour and rice. Taking items individually, flour is the 
single most significant expenditure followed by 'other' goods, clothing and boots. Other goods 
comprises a range of items from gifts and loans to newspapers, school fees and books, to large 
items such as motorbikes, radios and petrol. These items comprise a large proportion of 
household expenditure since they are often one-off lumpy expenditures. 
Household expenditure by wealth group 
The highest overall per person expenditure is among households in group 2, the lowest among 
households in group 4. 
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Table 19. Annual average household expenditure per person by wealth group (42 
Households) (Tugrik) 
1 
Richest 
Wealth Group 
2 3 4 
Poorest 
Flour 3839.0 3734.9 2496.2 2611.1 
Rice 1377.2 1588.2 458.9 508.9 
Tea 307.3 585.3 444.2 541.1 
Sugar 252.2 211.7 118.6 282.4 
Sweets 157.7 99.8 134.2 188.6 
Vegetables 40.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vodka & 215.6 377.7 499.9 124.1 
Tobacco 
Total Food 6189.9 6597.6 4152.0 4256.2 
Household 313.4 395.1 467.1 251.0 
Goods 
Clothing & 2628.6 1198.7 948.5 825.4 
Boots 
Human Health 53.2 24.3 144.6 191.7 
Animal Health 43.3 33.0 27.5 120.0 
Fodder and 527.6 528.3 185.2 0.0 
Hay 
7.1 Animal Tax 306.6 163.5 231.0 
Other 1290.1 2588.3 3057.7 567.6 
Total Non- 5162.8 4931.2 5061.6 1962.8 
Food 
Total 11352.8 11528.8 9213.6 6219.0 
Source: 42 household survey 
Households in the richest group spend around a third more per person on flour, over twice as 
much more on rice, almost twice as much more on vodka and tobacco, three times as much on 
clothing and boots and twice as much on other goods as households in the poorest group. 
Overall, the richest households spend just under a third more per person on food, and nearly 
three times as much on non-food items as the poorest households. In fact total 
expenditure on non-food goods is similar for groups 1, 2 and 3 but much less for group 4, 
members of which spend two thirds of their cash and barter expenditures on food. This 
suggests that on average poorer households are less able to afford and do not make 
expenditures on many non-food items, even where they are essential. The poorest households 
spend more per person on human health, suggesting more ill-health among this group. 
Evidence of long term expenditure on medical needs was found in this group. 
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Table 20. Composition of average annual household expenditure per person by 
wealth group, 1992-93 (42 households) (percent) 
1 
Richest 
Wealth Group 
2 3 4 
Poorest 
Flour 
Rice 
Tea 
Sugar 
Sweets 
Vegetables 
Vodka & 
Tobacco 
33.8 
12.1 
2.7 
2.2 
1.4 
0.4 
1.9 
32.4 
13.8 
5.1 
1.8 
0.9 
0.0 
3.3 
27.1 
5.0 
4.8 
1.3 
1.5 
0.0 
5.4 
42,0 
8.2 
8.7 
4.5 
3.0 
0.0 
2.0 
Total Food 54.5 57.3 45.1 68.4 
Household 2.8 
Goods 
Clothing & 23.2 
Boots 
Human Health 0.5 
Animal Health 0.4 
Fodder and 4.6 
Hay 
Animal Tax 2.7 
Other 11.3 
3.4 
10.4 
0.2 
0.3 
4.6 
1.4 
22.4 
5.1 
10.3 
1.6 
0.3 
2.0 
2.5 
33.1 
4.0 
13.3 
3.1 
1.9 
0.0 
0.1 
9.2 
Total Non-
Food 
45,5 42.7 54.9 31.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: 42 household survey 
Households in the poorest group spend a greater proportion of their expenditure on food, 
especially flour, and on human and animal health (medical expenses and medicines) than all 
other groups. They spend proportionately less than other groups on other goods, livestock tax 
and fodder and hay. This reflects the need for poorer households to devote a greater 
proportion of their income to immediate food needs; the difference in the proportion of 
expenditure divided between food and non-food needs is greater in group 4 than in the other 
three groups. 'Other' expenditures such as gifts, which make up a large part of non-food 
expenditure, along with expenditure on clothes and boots, are less significant for group 4 
households since they are less able to spend money on gifts or consumer goods such as 
motorbikes and radios. 
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Household expenditure by region 
Regional expenditure patterns reflect regional income patterns with Gobi households spending 
on average twice as much per person than Altai households and over three times as much as 
Steppe households. Gobi households spend more per person on almost all food products 
clothing and boots, fodder and hay and other goods. 
Table 21. Average annual per person household expenditure by region 1992-93 (42 
Households) (Tugrik) 
Gobi Steppe Altai 
Flour 4187.6 1806.0 2675.7 
Rice 1810.2 363.8 326.7 
Tea 753.5 214.4 296.3 
Sugar 313.0 70.7 119.6 
Sweets 183.0 41.3 218.7 
Vegetables 0.0 0.0 30.0 
Total Food 7247.3 2496.2 3667.0 
Vodka & 534.3 119.5 208.1 
Tobacco 
Household 458.6 105.6 395.6 
Goods 
Clothing & 1952.0 315.8 1302.6 
Boots 
Human Health 25.9 218.8 145.4 
Animal Health 66.1 14.3 22.1 
Fodder and Hay 565.3 214.3 33.5 
Animal Tax 206.7 49.1 224.8 
Other 3184.5 630.4 994.8 
Total Non-Food 6993.4 1667.8 3326.9 
Total 14240.7 4164.0 6993.9 
Source: 42 household survey 
Table 21 shows that expenditure on 'other' goods is significant, amounting to 22.4 percent of 
expenditure among Gobi households, 15.1 percent among steppe and 14.2 percent among 
Altai households. In the Gobi sums this is made up largely of expenditure on gifts, vehicles 
and transport expenses including petrol. In the Altai sums where some cost recovery in 
education has been introduced, much of this expenditure is on school fees, books and 
newspapers as well as other goods such as radios and sewing machines. In the steppe region 
other expenditures were made up largely of gifts and the occasional expensive item such as a 
new ger cover. 
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7. THE EXPERIENCE OF POVERTY IN THE HERDING ECONOMY 
Local measurement of poverty 
The measurement of poverty at local level is the responsibility of sum administrations who 
identify the number of poor households in each sum and target them for relief. In general 
estimates are based on the number of households and individuals with incomes falling below 
the minimum living level for rural areas. Estimates of household income are based on the total 
cash income a household receives, the size of the household's private livestock holdings and 
whether any household members fall into one of the six nationally identified vulnerable groups. 
However, individuals in the vulnerable groups are not generally targetted for assistance unless 
they are also poor, thus removing the problem of targeting the non-poor. 
Despite general adherence to these guidelines interpretations often differ, and poverty 
thresholds are calculated differently in different areas, with some based on wealth measures 
and some based on income estimates. For example in some areas poverty thresholds are based 
on a minimum herd size (21 bod per household in one area of Ovorkhangai) in others on the 
estimated production and market value of a herd of a given size (UNDP 1994). 
In the sample sums there were variations in the measurement process also. In Tariat sum, 
Arkhangai for example, the calculation is based on the monthly income of the household; in 
Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, it is based on the households estimated annual income 
divided by the total number of people in the household. In both places the estimated household 
income included pensions and benefits, total herd size in relation to family size, and income 
from livestock product sales. While household herd size was taken into account it did not 
appear that estimates regarding own consumption were included. 
In addition, in Tariat sum Arkhangai, these calculations were not worked out for all 
households in the sum but only for those which were first identified by bag governors as poor, 
largely according to a general measure of wealth based on herd size and lifestyle. While this 
may result in an accurate identification of the poorest households by officials who are 
themselves herders, it may not give the fullest picture of the situation in the sum as whole. 
Given these differences in measurement it is difficult to make any comparison between sums. 
During the period that fieldwork was undertaken (October and November 1993) the official 
poverty line for rural households was 1040 tg per person per month. Those persons whose 
income fell below the second threshold for rural households of 416 tg per month were 
considered to be in absolute poverty. 
Table 22 shows the number of households below the various poverty lines in each sample sum. 
The highest proportion of poor households is in Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor (37.4 
percent of households), compared to 18.6 percent in Kharkhorin and 12.1 percent in Tariat. In 
Bayan Tsagaan sum, as many as 10.8 percent of households are considered to be in absolute 
poverty compared to 6.0 percent in Kharkhorin and 3.8 percent in Tariat. In Kharkhorin sum, 
Ovorkhangai 66 percent of households considered to be in absolute poverty are resident in one 
of the three sum centre bags, while the rest are resident in bags with herding populations. In 
Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, most households in absolute poverty are herding 
households. 
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Table 22. Households below the poverty line, by sample sum, October/November 
1993 
Tariat (%) Kharkhorin (%) Bayan- (%) 
Tsagaan 
Arkhangai Ovorkhangai Bayan-
khongor 
Sum Population 5599 _ 13940 _ 3490 -
Total hhs 1383 (100) 3314 (100) 786 (100) 
Hhs below PL1 168 (12.1) 618 (18.6) 294 (37.4) 
Hhs below PL2 115 (8.3) 420 (12.7) 209 (26.5) 
Hhs below PL3 53 (3.8) 198 (6.0) 85 (10.8) 
Sum Centre hh 18 (1.3) 130 (3.9) 19 (2.4) 
Herding hh 35 (2.5) 68 (2.1) 66 (8.4) 
Note: PL1 = general poverty line based on hh herd size 
PL2 = households with per person income below 1040 tg 
PL3 = households with per person income below 416 tg 
Source: Sum statistics 
These figures bear little resemblance to MPPL figures which at the end of 1993 showed 33.5 
percent of the population to be below the poverty line in Arkhangai, 27.8 percent in 
Bayankhongor and 31.3 percent in Ovorkhangai. Either the figures are inaccurate or the sums 
studied are not representative of the aimag as a whole. Certainly, Bayan Tsagaan sum, 
Bayankhongor was one of the worst affected areas of the 1993 dzud, so it is likely that levels 
of poverty have increased there. 
Characteristics of poor households 
Although local poverty measures are not an entirely satisfactory measure of poverty in the 
rural economy, and are not reliable enough to give objective figures of the number of people in 
poverty, they can tell us something about the characteristics of poor households in rural areas. 
Used together with local perceptions of poverty as expressed by herders and officials 
themselves, it is possible to build up an initial picture of the poor in the pastoral economy. 
(i) Local perceptions of poverty 
Herders themselves have their own ideas about what makes people poor and these ideas are 
consistent across regions and different periods of research. Herders' perceptions about wealth 
and poverty were drawn from the criteria used by herders when asked to place households in 
different groups according to wealth status during wealth-ranking exercises. This exercise was 
described in chapter 2, 
Perceptions of wealth and poverty in the herding community are closely related to the size and 
composition of household herds, which is the primary criterion according to which households 
assign wealth status to different households. In addition, wealth status is defined in relation to 
a set of key assets, skills or attributes deemed necessary for effective livestock management. 
These include sufficient household labour and assets, and experience in livestock production. 
Since these assets are closely linked to the life-cycle stage of the individual household, there is 
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a strong link between perceived wealth status and life cycle stage. Wealth status is also defined 
in relation to household income and the capacity of households to get access to consumer 
goods and key production inputs such as fodder and transport. The capacity to respond to 
increased market opportunity, and to assist those in need, is also seen as significant. Finally, 
wealth status is defined in relation to a household's ability to provide hospitality to guests, 
participate in social and cultural events, and by the overall comfort and well-being of the 
camp. 
As a result, the wealthiest households are perceived to be those of middle age people with low 
dependency ratios and sufficient labour to manage the household herd. Such households are 
composed of skilled herders, with experience going back many generations, who have full 
access to key resources such as water, pasture, fodder and transport. Ownership of high status 
consumer goods such as motorbikes and generators is also an indicator of high wealth. 
Wealthy households also have above average livestock holdings and in particular a large 
number of horses or camels for herding. They are also seen as having enough income to be 
able to make trips to Ulaanbaatar (for medical treatment or marketing) and to provide food 
and hospitality for guests. 
Less wealthy or middle-wealth households are seen as reasonably self-sufficient, composed of 
good herders with access to key resources. They are seen as having fewer livestock than the 
first group and larger numbers of dependent as opposed to labour-age children. These 
households are often seen as composed of younger herders from wealthy households, with less 
income available for consumer goods or luxuries. 
Poor households are generally perceived to be those with fewer animals, although herders tend 
to make clear distinctions between what they perceive to be 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor. 
Households with average herd sizes who are thought of as having limited herding skills and are 
therefore 'lazy' or 'bad' herders, are perceived to be poorer than households with fewer animals 
but good herd management skills. Households headed by women are almost always perceived 
as poor regardless of the size of their livestock holdings. Poor households are seen as having 
few large animals for transport and day-to-day work, poor living conditions and little food to 
offer guests. These perceptions have also been borne out by other studies - particularly the 
impression that poor households are lazy or that wealth or poverty is based on the ability to 
respond to social and economic change (Harper 1994, Narantuya & Schoellhammer 1993). 
The perceptions about wealth and poverty held by herders themselves match very closely with 
conclusions drawn from analysis of rich and poor households in the three sample sums studied. 
Analysis of case study data, general bag statistics and sum poverty statistics show wide 
differences in the characteristics of the richest and poorest households in all the sample bags. 
There are also differences between the characteristics of the poorest households in the three 
sample areas as identified by herders, and those identified as being in absolute poverty by the 
sum administrations in Tariat and Bayan Tsagaan sums. Overall differences between rich and 
poor were noted in the following areas: household size, household dependency ratio, herding 
skill and experience, income and assets, consumption, and gender, all of which are important 
indicators of poverty in the herding economy. 
(ii) Household size, dependency ratios and experience 
General bag statistics suggest that on average larger households are better off than smaller 
ones. This reflects the fact that poorer households are often older single people living alone or 
with one other person. The statistics show that poorer households have an average of 3.0 
members and richer households an average of 5.1 members. 
However, poverty statistics suggests that households in absolute poverty are larger than 
average, and have considerably fewer average numbers of livestock per person than the 
poorest households in the sample bags. For example herding households in absolute poverty 
in Tariat sum, have on average 4.6 household members and only 3.3 bod of livestock per 
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person, compared with 3.2 household members and 7.9 bod of livestock per person for the 
poorest group of households in the sample bag studied. From these data, absolute poverty 
appears to be strongly related to a larger household and fewer animals. This information is 
summarised in Appendix 4. 
Poor households are also likely to have higher dependency ratios than richer ones. Data from 
50 households from the three sample sums found that households had an average dependency 
ratio of 1.4 ie. 1.4 dependents (those over 60 and under 16) to every worker in the household. 
The highest dependency ratio was among the poorest group (1.6) and decreased with wealth; 
the richest group had a dependency ratio of 1.0. 
Poor households comprise both the very young and very old. On average however, poorer 
households are usually younger and have less skill and experience than richer households. 
Average figures for the 50 sample households in the three sums studied, found that household 
heads of the poorest households had an average age of 40.5 years compared to an average of 
50.3 for the richest households. Data from the 85 absolute poor households in Bayan Tsagaan 
sum showed that household heads had an average age of 35.5 years. 
Poor households are also more likely to lack herding skill and experience. On average, 
households in the 50 household sample had an average of 19.2 years experience in herding, 
with the richest having an average of 29.3 years and the poorest 16.6 years experience. 
Among the poorer households are those who are relatively new to herding as well as newly 
married herders from poor households. 
(Hi) Income and assets 
Household incomes are currently a poor indicator of poverty in the herding economy, since 
monetary income does not necessarily reflect a household's wealth status. Evidence from 
chapter 6 suggests that poorer households may increase their total incomes relative to richer 
households by making necessity sales of livestock, while richer households tend to withdraw 
from sales of live animals where possible. Poorer households may also increase total incomes 
through salaries and benefits, which may offset the fewer sales of livestock products made by 
these households. 
However, composition of household income is some indicator of poverty. Poorer households 
tend to rely on sales of live animals rather than livestock products and have a strong reliance 
on pensions and benefits. Data from chapter 6 shows that the poorest households have the 
lowest proportion of income from livestock product sales and the highest from pensions. The 
lower potential for earning income from sales of a range of livestock products significantly 
increases the need for poor households to raise incomes through sales and exchanges of live 
animals. As a result, the highest proportion of income of the poorest household is made up of 
live animal sales. Sales of live animals are lower among poor households in areas where 
salaries provide a regular source of cash income. 
Poor households are more likely to lack the key assets necessary for efficient herding such as a 
diverse and sufficiently large herd, sufficient labour and production inputs. 
Household herds are the best indicator of poverty in the herding economy. Poorer households 
have smaller herds and often lack a diverse herd structure. Chapter 5 shows that the poorest 
households own between 6 and 11 percent of total private bod of livestock, while the richest 
own between 42 and 52 percent of total bod of livestock. Absolutely poor herding households 
in Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, and Tariat sum, Arkhangai own less than half the 
number of livestock per person than the poorest quartile and a quarter as many livestock per 
person than the bag average, (see Appendix 4). Poor households are also less likely to have a 
diverse herd structure and fewer types of large animals for transport and herding purposes. 
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Poor households are more likely to have labour constraints than richer households, either 
because they are young with few labour-age children, or because they comprise older single-
headed households. These households are also more likely to rely heavily on collective herding 
or assistance with specific herding tasks. Poor households are more likely to lack key inputs 
such as fodder and hay, relying more heavily on own production of these resources, which 
exacerbates existing labour constraints. 
(iv) Household consumption patterns 
Qualitative evidence based on household consumption patterns suggests that some of the 
poorest households do not produce sufficient livestock products to satisfy their own 
consumption and are more likely to experience seasonal food shortages than other households. 
Evidence from a number of households with few livestock suggests that households 
experience seasonal food shortages in spring when winter meat supplies run low and in 
summer when households rely heavily on milk products to satisfy consumption needs. 
Households with few milking animals may rely on loans of milk and other products from 
neighbouring households at this time. 
The way herding households live can also be an important indicator of poverty. Poor 
households own a single small ger and minimal furniture, seldom replace outside covers and 
may not have sufficient felt layers for winter insulation. Wealthier households usually have 
larger living gers and often an additional storage or cooking ger. Outside covers are replaced 
regularly and gers have adequate furniture and floor coverings. Wealthier households as a rule 
own their own winter and spring shelters which are substantial with adequate covering for 
livestock. Very wealthy households in some areas also have their own house or storage 
building in which to store hay and fodder. Poorer households often share or borrow winter 
shelters from others and they may be less well maintained. 
(v) Households headed by women 
Households headed by women are on average poorer than households headed by men. 
Although evidence is not available for all three sums studied, data from Bayan Tsagaan sum, 
Bayankhongor found that of the 165 households in the bag 26 were headed by women. Of 
these 26, 23 were located in wealth quartiles 3 and 4, the poorest. 
Women headed households are often poor becaue they lack livestock and labour, and often 
have large numbers of dependent children. Poor women household heads are usually single 
women from poor families and so their poverty is defined largely by their social position. Most 
have never married and have therefore not acquired any private animals through marriage. 
During the collective period these households maintained their independence through 
collective salaries; following privatisation, many have ceased to herd independently, given 
labour constraints and small numbers of private livestock. Many have returned to live with 
parents and relatives, losing their independent status; this is a key indicator of relative poverty. 
Women-headed households are more likely to be entrenched in poverty than other poor 
households. Women are direct producers in the pastoral economy (of small stock, livestock 
products for sale and consumption) and reproducers of labour within the household. With a 
dual responsibility for both production and reproduction, women work longer hours than men 
and are less mobile (Cooper and Gelezhamtsin 1993). Currently women are more labour 
allocating to subsistence production within the household, in the form of direct processing (of 
milk products, leather and wool goods) for home consumption rather than for sale. Increased 
time and mobility constraints suggest that women-headed households may have less access to 
markets, and will be less able to raise productivity and increase incomes over the long term. 
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(vi) The process of impoverishment 
The process by which households become poor varies according to the type of poverty which 
households experience. Households experience both transient and chronic poverty. Transient 
poverty may for example be an outcome of life cycle stage, or it can be triggered by risk or by 
seasonal shortfalls in income and consumption. Chronic poverty is more likely to be the 
outcome of long term social processes which affect a household's ability to accumulate the 
necessary skills or assets to participate fully in herding. 
Transiently poor households include young, relatively new and inexperienced herders, some of 
whom have only recently started independent herding after dividing from their parent 
households. These households have had little chance to develop their herds, and remain 
vulnerable to shocks and risk arising from privatisation, as well as from the environment. 
Households at such an early stage in their life-cycle often have labour shortages, since children 
are usually too young to work. As households pursue lower productivity, more risk-averse 
production strategies (such as diversifying the species composition of their herds), labour 
availability has become more critical. 
Transiently poor households also include those who returned to herding around the time of 
privatisation to get access to private animals when the collective herds were divided. These 
households include people made redundant by state enterprises, and other urban-rural 
migrants. They often have limited technical knowledge or skills and few assets or sayings. 
Some of those who entered herding following privatisation have no rights to private animals 
through state or company channels and are at risk of becoming chronically poor. The 
transiently poor also include households which have lost animals through accidents (including 
predators) or natural calamity (such as drought, dzud or violent hail storms). 
Chronically poor households include those from poor kin groups with few livestock. These 
households seldom inherit many livestock or good skills from their parents with which to 
escape poverty. Support from kin is insufficient, because the entire group is poor. Some 
households are chronically poor because they are incompetent herders, who do not have 
sufficient skills and who may squander livestock for current consumption. Other chronically 
poor households include those whose total capabilities are reduced for reasons of age, gender 
or disability. This group includes orphans, the elderly, those with physical or mental disabilities 
and single women heads of household. Clearly all who are vulnerable are not poor, but in these 
cases chronic poverty is determined by the combination of small herds and additional factors 
which create vulnerabilities. 
Poverty, vulnerability and risk 
The level of wealth differentiation in pastoral communities is exacerabated by the risky nature 
of the herding environment. Fratkin and Roth (1990) have shown that poorer households have 
lost greater proportion of their herds than richer households following drought, while Templer 
et al (1993) have shown that livestock losses from the dzud in Mongolia in 1993 were greatest 
among poorer households. Further case study evidence (discussed below) supports this view. 
Poor households and households on the threshold of poverty are more vulnerable than others 
to the range of risks, shocks and stresses previously alleviated by the support of collective 
infrastructure. These range from seasonal peaks and troughs in household income and 
expenditure, to social shocks such as loss of labour through illness, injury or death to climatic 
shocks such as heavy snow or dzud. 
In the past (and to some extent the present) vulnerable households were buffered against 
seasonal consumption shortages through cash advances, salaries and regular purchases of basic 
food stuffs. Increasingly households are responding to food shortages through increases in the 
consumption and sale of livestock, resulting in decreasing herd sizes and greater poverty over 
time. 
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Also under the collective, labour deficit households received additional assistance from 
collectives during peak periods and were more effectively protected from the risk of livestock 
loss from disease or climatic stresses through free and regular supplies of inputs and 
supplementary feed. Currently poorer households are less likely to make purchases of 
supplementary feed, medicines and drugs so that animals are likely to be weaker and less 
quickly supplied with supplementary feed if households experience animal disease, drought or 
dzud. In addition, poorer households are likely to have less labour than richer ones to cope 
with additional tasks during a period of dzud. 
The impact of dzud on poverty 
The impact of dzud on poverty is clear if one considers the impact of the 1993 dzud on herding 
households in Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor. This severely affected a number of western 
aimags and resulted in heavy livestock loss.9 In Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, a total of 
39,000 livestock were lost, comprising 19,000 adult livestock and 20,000 young animals. In 
the worst affected area in the south west of bag no.l, herders lost between 50 and 87 percent 
of their herds. 
Livestock losses were examined for 20 households from Bag no.l Bayan Tsagaan sum, 
Bayankhongor. The loss rate was calculated by subtracting the number of livestock lossses 
from the size of the prQ-dzud herd for each household. The pre-dzud herd was calculated as 
the current herd, plus dzud losses, plus livestock sales and slaughter for own consumption 
during the period in question. 
The data (summarised below in table 23) show that poorer households incurred 
proportionately higher losses than richer ones, with households from the poorest group losing 
on average 51,6 percent of their herds, over 10 percent more than the richest group who had 
an average percentage loss of 40 percent. The lowest average loss was among households in 
group three. The highest single proportionate loss was 86.1 percent, the lowest 10.7 percent 
both among households in the poorest group, showing the greater variability of percentage 
losses incurred by this group. 
Tabie 23. Proportion of livestock losses among 20 households in Bayan Tsagaan 
sum, by wealth group, shown as percent lost of pre-dzud herd 
Sample Groups 1 and 2 Group 3 
Average Richest 
Group 4 
Poorest 
Percent loss 43.5 
Standard Dev. 20.4 
Maximum 86.1 
Minimum 10.7 
40.0 
20.1 
68.1 
16.5 
36.4 
15.4 
57.5 
15.7 
51.6 
21.3 
86.1 
10.7 
Source: 20 household survey 
9. A more detailed account of these events as they affected the aimag as a whole is 
summarised in Appendix 5. 
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The impact on the viability of the herds of the poorest households was considerable. For 
example one household, with a pre-dzud herd of 1216 animals lost 61 percent of its herd, 
leaving a current herd of 467 animals. Despite incurring massive losses, this household's total 
herd remains at the top end of scale. By contrast, the highest proportionate loss in the sample 
(86.1 percent) was incurred by one of the poorest women-headed households, reducing her 
overall herd from 151 to 21 animals. The long term viability of this household was 
considerably reduced. 
Most household's total losses included both leased and private livestock. Losses of leased 
livestock were only paid back to the company from private herds when households were 
considered to be negligent in the care of leased animals. For poorer households deemed 
negligent this was considerably more difficult than for richer households. For example in the 
case of the woman who lost a total of 151 livestock, 40 of these livestock were leased from 
the company. In order to pay these back the household used the 32 animals it was due to 
receive from the privatisation of sheep and goats due to take place six months after the dzud in 
September 1993. A further eight animals were borrowed from relatives to pay back to the 
company. 
Heavy livestock losses were incurred for several reasons. Many households were moving their 
animals between winter and spring shelters at the time of the dzud. As a result it was difficult 
for them to reach shelter for the animals. Few households had any remaining hay or fodder to 
give to the animals and only got supplementary supplies from the sum centre after the fourth 
day of the dzud during which time greatest losses were incurred. Households were unable to 
make trails through the snow to enable the animals to reach pasture. 
Herders overall response to the dzud seems to have been determined mainly by their labour 
availability and wealth status. Women heads of household (who usually manage labour 
shortages by drawing on relatives living elsewhere at peak times) were particularly vulnerable. 
Households with additional labour were able to clear snow for livestock and go to the sum 
centre to get fodder and hay. 
In most cases households did not have any store of fodder or hay to give to animals 
immediately. In the case of one richer household, fodder was stored in a building near the 
winter shelter but was only accessible after three days. Most households made regular trips 
during the dzud to the sum centre where they purchased fodder and hay at reduced prices from 
the Emergency fund. Some fodder and hay was given to all households free. Access to 
transport animals to carry this was important, which gave richer households a considerable 
advantage over poorer ones. 
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8. SUPPORT TO POOR HOUSEHOLDS AT LOCAL LEVEL 
Formal support to poor households 
Traditionally in Mongolia there has been some institutionalised support to poor and vulnerable 
households. In the pre-revolutionary period this took the form of the local (khushuu) 
administration and the monasteries; in the collective period, the negdel and sum 
administrations had primary responsibility for preventing destitution and providing support in 
the event of natural calamity. The desire for continuity in this is reflected in both the level of 
institutional support currently provided by the ex-negdel companies and by the level of 
expectation among herders themselves. 
In the pre-revolutionary period, both long-term and emergency assistance was provided 
unofficially by monasteries, with poorer households often sending young boys to a monastery 
as a form of social insurance (Potkanski and Szynkiewicz 1993). However the high proportion 
of assetless or destitute individuals and unequal wage labour relationships between rich and 
poor households suggests that assistance to the poor was marginal. It is not surprising 
therefore that the greatest support for collectivisation following the 1921 revolution came 
from poor herders seeking a way out of destitution through socialist reform (Humphrey 1978). 
Under collectivisation, inequalities between households were compensated by substantial state 
and collective interventions. Poor herders were automatically supported by inputs and other 
services provided by the collective, including regular monthly salaries which were often paid in 
advance. In addition, the collective supplied assistance to labour-deficit households during 
periods of peak demand, and poor households received additional livestock for household 
consumption if their own herds were insufficient. 
Currently the ex-negdel livestock companies to some degree continue this important safety net 
to herders. In some, areas herders are given advances on salaries and on expected supplies of 
livestock products, as well as subsidised transport, fodder and hay supplies. Some companies 
also contribute to emergency payments in the event of calamity. Salaries themselves (where 
they exist) are an important safety net, giving households greater opportunity to purchase 
foodstuffs on a regular basis without resorting to sales of livestock for this purpose. 
Of the three sums studied in detail, salaries were only received by herders in Kharkhorin sum, 
Ovorkhangai. Herders state that salaries increase their access to cash and basic goods and are 
an important alternative to live animal sales for poor households. The companies have also 
played an important role in selling basic goods such as flour to herders on a monthly basis, as 
well as providing free transport services, fodder and hay. However salaries are low, prices are 
rising, and the companies enforce fines on unfulfilled quotas. This is often to the detriment of 
poor households who are often working on the margins of production and who are more 
vulnerable to shocks and stresses and least able to afford fines set at market prices. 
Companies in Kharkhorin sum, Arkhangai also stated that while they want to increase salaries 
when prices for livestock products improve, they felt that the current organisation of lease 
agreements was inefficient; with too many herders herding too few animals. They are keen to 
rationalise the system by taking animals away from the least efficient and productive herders; 
already company herd sizes and salaries are based on the skill and experience of the herding 
household. Two companies stated that it was their intention to withdraw lease agreeements 
from bad herders, which included poor households. Companies in Kharkhorin sum, Arkhangai 
also stated that they gave support to poorer households through the sale of livestock at below 
the market price for winter food supplies. In Tariat sum, Arkhangai as well as Kharkhorin 
sum, Ovorkhangai, companies have provided emergency assistance for medical expenses for 
poor households. 
Assistance to the poor is provided in a number of other ways. Social security payments in the 
form of pensions and benefits are the most wide ranging form of support to poor households. 
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T h e value of pensions and benefits has declined rapidly as increases have not kept in line with 
inflation, but regular cash payments from these sources remain very important to poor 
households. As income and expenditure data shows income from pensions and benefits forms 
26.7 percent of per person household income for poor households in the sample. 
Poor households are also supported by the Social Assistance Fund, a national fund which is 
used to help poor households targeted for assistance. The fund is small; in 1993, allocations 
were less than 400 tg ($US1) for each person below the poverty line. The fund also appears to 
b e erratically distributed at aimag and sum level. In Tariat sum, Arkhangai, the sum 
administration allocated 19,000 tg to households identified as below the poverty line in sums 
o f between 1,500 and 2,000 tg. The sum has received no money since September 1992 and so 
has set up its own fund based on individual donations. This will be used to fund emergency 
requirements for poor households such as funeral arrangements. 
Further state assistance is received through the Children's Fund directed at half orphans, 
orphans and large households with many children. In 1993 114,000 tg was distributed among 
300 herding and 70 sum centre households in the form of small cash payments according to 
the ages of children within the household. In addition, assistance is provided by sum 
organisations to retired workers in the form of goods, and help to cut and prepare wood and 
carry water. 
In Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai, a total of 250,000 tg has been spent from the sum fund 
made up of state and local company contributions; 520 households have received payments 
between September 1992 and October 1993. In Bayan Tsagaan sum, one-off payments of 
flour were given to 85 households below the poverty line from a poverty fund made up largely 
of donations from ex-negdel organisations (around 70,000 tg) and the aimag poverty fund 
(around 10,000 tg). 
These funds provide limited support to poor households. They receive minimal and irregular 
funding from district administrations and rely heavily on contributions from private 
organisations. Given their small funding base these funds target households which fall below 
the national minimum living level and are limited to providing one-off cash assistance to cover 
peaks in household expenditure and emergency medical or travel expenses. 
Individual sums have also received some form of international assistance to address poverty. 
In Tariat sum, 5 tonnes of flour were received as aid from the World Food Programme. This 
was given initially to the 53 absolute poor households identified by the sum in the form of 13.5 
kilos for each household member. The rest was allocated to the remaining 115 poor 
households. In Kharkhorin sum 15 tonnes of flour were distributed amng 305 poor and 
vulnerable households in a range of categories; pregnant women, women with children under 
six months, orphans and single headed households and those identified as absolute poor. 
Informal support to poor households through customary institutions 
With state social support systems unstable or inadequate, and the current level of company 
support to herders unlikely to survive increased market development, the importance of 
customary institutions in providing support and security to poor and marginal households is 
increasing. The nature of these institutions and their current status as supporting mechanisms 
to vulnerable households is discussed below. 
Collective institutions and systems of customary support play an important role in supporting 
the needs of poor and vulnerable households in rural economies (Platteau 1993, Burgess and 
Stern 1993), and are often seen as limiting patterns of wealth differentiation in pastoral 
communities since no household or group is allowed to become destitute (Fratkin and Roth 
1990). The re-emergence of customary institutions in response to changes in the Monolian 
pastoral economy has been well documented (Mearns 1993, Potkanski and Szynkiewicz 
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1993), while Sneath (1993) has considered the particular role of kin networks in creating fluid 
systems of support to the poor. 
(i) Individual and collective risk 
Customary institutions serve to manage both collective and individual risk. A 'collective' or 
'covariate' risk is one which affects a community as a whole (such as extreme winter 
conditions, drought or market failure) while 'individual' risks are those which affect individuals 
at random (such as shortages of food or labour) (Templer et al 1993). 
To some extent customary institutions help households manage collective risk because they 
guarentee the access of all households (including the poor) to key natural resources such as 
pasture land and water points. This allows, for example, for some flexibility of pasture use 
under difficult conditions such as drought. However, in general when risks such as a dzud 
affect an entire community at the same time customary forms of support are limited. This was 
certainly the case when a major dzud was experienced in Bayan Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, 
in March 1993 when the herding community relied heavily on agencies outside the local area 
for assistance. 
Individual risk is managed more effectively within the community. In most rural communities 
there is a range of reciprocal arrangements through which households exchange labour, cash, 
food and livestock. These arrangements take a number of forms, such as gift-exchange, loans 
and adoption and have a range of outcomes - they may allow for the overall redistribution of 
livestock between generations or the social advancement of certain individuals - but they are 
also mutually beneficial. Based as much on obligation as altruism they create a system of risk 
insurance between households whereby "current generosity ensures future reciprocity" 
(Burgess and Stern 1990). This system is particularly beneficial to poor households who are 
more likely to be at risk of shortfalls in income or labour. Thus customary institutions play a 
strong role in consumption smoothing and risk spreading for poor households, especially 
where these households' own forms of self-insurance (such as stored foods) are ineffective. 
During periods of relative stability or prosperity households are likely to invest in these 
institutions (for example through gift giving) as a means of confirming social status and 
determining their right to make claims against them in times of crisis or need (Swift 1989). As 
households become increasingly vulnerable during a period of transition or crisis, they make 
claims for assistance (in the form of labour or resources) on other households within the 
community. 
(ii) Exchanges of gifts and labour 
With the existence of the kinds of formal support systems discussed above, it has been argued 
that in Mongolia there is a "lack of [any] clear, specialised redistribution, or mutual assistance 
mechanisms within the social system" (Potkanski and Szynkiewicz 1993). However, a number 
of customary institutions exist which allow for some redistribution of livestock and labour and 
which act as important mechanisms by which households make investments in the local 
community over the longer term. 
The most significant customary institutions for this purpose are based on gift exchange. 
Traditionally, the principal occasions where livestock are given as gifts are during nair 
ceremonies. These are feasts organised to celebrate a marriage or a child's first hair cutting 
(Potkanski and Szynkiewicz 1993). Marriage ceremonies act as a form of pre-inheritance with 
both partners receiving a share of livestock from the herds of their parents and of other close 
relatives. A child's first hair cutting occurs between the ages of three and five and a ceremony 
is arranged for this purpose. Children receive a range of gifts from relatives and friends 
including livestock, money and clothing. 
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These occasions are an important means by which households make long-term investments in 
their herd and in the future herds of their children. While the ceremony itself requires 
considerable short-term investment by the household, the long-term benefits are high. A 
household of average wealth, giving a nair for two children, may slaughter one large and one 
small animal and provide milk products and other food stuffs for the ceremony. Each child will 
receive around five smallstock plus other goods in return. Under current market conditions 
however, the ability of poorer households to afford even a modest nair is limited, although 
they may have the opportunity to borrow foodstuffs and other goods from relatives to ease the 
immediate costs of the ceremony. 
Households also receive animals from relatives during tsagaan tsar (New Year) which occurs 
in the month of February. Although not traditionally an occasion where relatives exchange 
livestock as gifts, this may become an increasingly important mechanism by which poorer 
households are able to receive livestock from wealthier relatives. Young animals received by 
the children of a poorer household from a wealthy relative during tsagaan tsar can be used to 
pay back loans of livestock (made by the same relative) the following year. Poorer households 
who make regular claims on wealthier relatives recognise the importance of repayment to 
ensure that similar claims can be made in the future. 
The redistribution of labour is made through the common practice of adoption which serves to 
solve the subsistence problems of those with many children and fulfill the labour requirements 
of those without. Children are adopted largely from relatives or close friends since it is 
recognised that the exchange is an unequal one (Potkanski and Szynkiewicz 1993). This is an 
important means by which women-headed households especially are able to gain access to 
sufficient labour. 
(iii) Risk and social organisation 
The redistribution of livestock and labour is mediated through specific forms of social and 
economic organisation which also act as mutual support systems for poorer households. The 
most important of these is the khot ail, a level of household organisation which existed prior 
to collectivisation whereby a number of households cluster in a single camp and move and 
work together as an autonomous herding unit. 
In many areas of Mongolia the khot ail has re-emerged following decollectivisation largely to 
cope with the increased labour required by diverse herd structures. There is considerable 
variation however, in the size and types of khot ail camps which have emerged; in high 
potential areas they can involve between five and 15 households, in low potential areas as few 
as two or three. 
In general, there are three main types of khot ail. 
- those comprised of close kin (most usually headed by a father and his married sons and 
daughters) with no related households. 
- those comprised of a central core group of closely related households, but with additional 
unrelated or temporary member households. 
- those made up of loosely related or unrelated households with no clear dominant family 
group (Edstrdm and Enkhamgalan 1993; and PALD 1993b). 
In khot ails of the first type, membership is permanent throughout the year with member 
households sharing winter and spring shelters and making seasonal moves to the same 
pastures. Often where these khot ails are very large, they may divide into one or more shelters 
for winter and spring periods. Larger numbers of these types of khot ail are found in high 
potential areas where the proportion of private livestock ownership is high and where most 
winter and spring shelters are also privately owned. In Tariat sum, Arkhangai the majority of 
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khot ail were found to be of this type. Given the low level of company intervention, collective 
action is particularly high. 
In khot ails of the second type, membership is more likely to be seasonal with non-related 
members often joining for a specific periods when they perceive the benefits of association to 
be highest. For example, a household with a sizeable herd and adequate labour may herd 
independently during the summer (benefiting from the exclusive use of high quality pasture) 
but will join the khoi ail for collaborative herding in the colder more difficult months of 
autumn and winter. Membership of the khot-ail in these cases is often based on longterm 
association with the core household group or on quasi-kin status with links through adoption. 
Khot ails of the third type have more fluid membership as their composition is not so tightly 
based around a core kin group and often includes some herders new to the area. These types 
of loose and often highly seasonal khot ail are commonly found in areas now controlled by ex-
state farm livestock companies. These companies have retained considerable control over the 
organisation of herding production and own the majority of livestock and shelters, so 
households often form different khot ail in different seasons according to company 
requirements. As a result, summer khot ail are often composed of loose relatives or friends 
who herd the same species for the company and who form a wider milking group composed of 
four or five khot ail. They may form separate khot ail for autumn and spring and split up again 
for winter. Khot ails of this type are particularly found in Kharkhorin sum, Ovorkhangai. 
(iv) Benefits of khot-ail relationships 
Households form khot ail largely to capture economies of scale in herding. The significance of 
the khot ail in this respect varies however, between the occasional pooling of labour between 
otherwise independent units, and a high degree of species specialisation between households. 
Within some closely knit khot ail individual households often herd one species for the entire 
khot ail on a long term basis, thus reducing the overall labour input required by individual 
members. In other areas where there is no such specialisation, most khot ails rotate herding 
tasks between member households every three to five days. Rotational herding of this kind has 
particular importance in the post-negdel period since it allows households to free labour for 
tasks which have become increasingly important since decollectivisation, such as cutting hay 
and a wide variety of product processing. 
Households also pool resources for a variety of tasks such as vaccinating livestock, 
transporting milk for processing, moving, collecting wood, cutting hair and wool and 
preparing and mending winter shelters. In some cases there is also cooperation in the training 
of animals, hunting and in the preparation of nair celebrations. 
This division of labour is particularly beneficial to labour-deficit households (young single 
headed households and the elderly) who are not normally required to perform herding tasks 
and whose labour is often freed for household and other tasks. In addition the existence of a 
broad base of available labour within the khot ail can serve as an important risk minimising 
strategy in the event of natural calamity. In sudden heavy snows, large amounts of labour are 
required to bring animals to camp shelters quickly and to provide constant watch to ensure 
their immediate safety. Households with little labour rely on the assistance of others under 
such circumstances and livestock loss is minimised as a result. Other social risks such as 
temporary or permanent loss of labour within a household as a result of sickness or absence 
can also be accommodated within a khot ail, with other households giving assistance in a 
range of herding and household tasks. 
In areas of lower ecological potential where khot ails are not a viable form of social or 
economic organisation (because pastures are not productive enough to support large herds), 
labour relations between households are often confined to pooling transport for nomadic 
moves, training animals, felt and hay making. The absence of khot ails in these more marginal 
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environments however, does not exclude a whole range of informal labour relationships 
between households in a single neighbourhood or family group which come into play as and 
when necessary. Occasionally, small and highly seasonal khot ail groupings, composed of two 
(exceptionally three) poor households, come together for the summer months primarily to pool 
labour. Other poor households will usually develop loose links to a larger group of related 
(usually wealthy) households from whom they receive assistance in herding at peak periods 
and other benefits (such as collective hay cutting or felt making) by association. 
(v) The khot-ail as a social safety net 
In addition to advantages in the allocation of labour, the khot ail provides an important social 
safety net to poorer households. This is achieved through a whole range of loans and 
exchanges which take place between member households. These range from the regular 
exchange of every day goods to the loan of livestock for specific purposes. 
Loans of basic food stuffs (small amounts of flour and salt, tea, matches, tobacco and candles) 
occur regularly within the khot ail and reflect the need for mutually supporting exhanges in an 
environment largely isolated from markets. These loans are made on an almost daily basis 
across all wealth categories and are paid back rapidly. Loans of other food stuffs such as milk, 
milk products, and large quantities of flour are less common and made only to poorer 
households by wealthier kin in the same khot ail or richer relatives living elsewhere. Although 
characterised as 'loans' they in fact constitute a food security safety net for the receiving 
households who seldom have the ability to pay back the loan. This form of assistance is often 
received in exchange for labour with the poorer household assisting in milking or other tasks 
where possible. Among close relatives within a khot ail such a relationship is implicit rather 
than explicit but under some circumstances khot ail relationships between non-related 
households are based primarily on the exchange of labour for livestock products. 
Loans of livestock are carefully managed transactions between households within khot ail and 
neighbourhood groups. Although within khot ails livestock are combined for herding 
purposes, they by no means constitute a shared herd. The most common livestock loans are of 
draught animals (cattle and camels) for nomadic moves. Households have come to rely on 
traditional methods of transport in the absence of affordable or accessible vehicles in the 
transition period, but few households have sufficient draught animals for this purpose and 
frequently borrow from other households. Within closely-knit khot ails draught animals and 
carts may be pooled and households moves staggered, but in others these animals are not 
automatically shared. For some households who are marginal to a khot ail therefore, 
investments in the khot ail through loans of small stock and labour, are often necessary to 
secure access to the draught animals of others. 
Loans of livestock for sales have become increasingly important in an economy still 
characterised by high levels of non-monetised exchange. The majority of exchanges for flour, 
household goods and materials are made with traders who visit households requesting 
livestock of a specific age and species. Where a household wishes to make an exchange but 
does not have the specified animal, another household within the khot ail may lend an animal 
of a particular category for a period of up to one year, and will be repaid with a comparable 
animal. Loans of smallstock (sheep and goats) are most usual but larger animals (cattle and 
horses) may also be loaned for larger purchases. These loans are made for a variety of reasons 
and across all wealth categories but usually to households poor in labour or livestock who 
either have some animals herded by relatives elsewhere, or whose herd size is too small to 
allow livestock sales. 
Loans of livestock for household consumption are not common and are usually only made to 
the poorest households either by close relatives within the same khot ail or by richer relatives 
in the wider community. These occur at critical points in spring when the households own 
supply of 'idish' or winter meat has been exhausted. These loans are important in allowing 
poorer households not to slaughter livestock when at its thinnest and in helping them to 
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remain food secure until the summer when a greater supply of milk and milk products is 
available. 
There is no evidence that households loan milking animals to poorer households, even where 
such animals are available. In some cases even milk itself is not actually given to the household 
in need but consumed by the receiving household at the household where milking takes place. 
For very food insecure households who may not produce any milk products themselves during 
the summer months, visits to other households are a necessity for the consumption of airag 
(fermented mare's milk) and tarag (yoghurt). 
Following natural disaster poorer households also commonly borrow animals in order to pay 
back lost animals to the company according to the terms of their lease agreement. Relatives 
assist poorer households following heavy losses from both predators and dzud. 
(vi) The future of support within the khot ail 
The types of support and assistance discussed above operate within all khot ail regardless of 
the overall wealth of member households. However, the level of support tends to increase 
with need and this has different implications for khot ails depending on their wealth. 
Although no distinct connection can be observed between khot ail composition and wealth 
status (Mearns 1993, PALD 1993b) most areas have some khot ails composed of both poor 
and rich households. This is often a life-cycle effect: in khot ails based on kin relationships, 
older members tend to be wealthier than their children (PALD 1993b). However there is also 
evidence that khot ails are often composed of households of similar wealth status with richer 
and poorer kin often grouping together. 
As entire close kin groups may be either rich or poor depending on the historical basis of their 
livestock holdings, khot ails may not be able to function as mutually supporting mechanisms in 
the case of poorer groups. While richer khot ails are composed of households which are easily 
able to adjust to shocks and stresses, poorer khot ails are often burdened with the 
responsibility of supporting weaker kin. Some of the poorest groups contain one or two 
households which are effectively no longer viable as independent herding units, and are only 
sustained by the support of their relatives. Since these kin are themselves not rich this is likely 
to undermine the whole unit in the long-term and increase the vulnerability of the poorest 
groups in the herding community. 
Strengths and weaknesses of customary risk management 
The examples cited above give some indication of the level of support which poor households 
receive from within the community. They also highlight the strengths and weaknesses of these 
institutions as a way of effectively managing poverty in the long term. 
Customary institutions are most effective at dealing with individual risk and are more likely to 
have an impact on transient as opposed to chronic poverty; small loans of food and goods are 
more easily available to the poor than long term loans of livestock to increase herd size. They 
are also effective in other ways. Private transfers to the poor and vulnerable are quickly and 
easily made, given the close physical proximity of kin and neighbours. This allows for both 
small and regular transfers as well as long terms loans. Loans and transfers are made between , 
households well known to each other, who are well placed to assess an individual's capacity to 
repay in cash or in kind. They are also well placed to assess the true nature of the need and 
whether hardship is derived from negligence or bad luck. Traditional forms of insurance are, 
therefore, likely to avoid some of the problems of more formal or market based insurance 
mechanisms. 
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Customary institutions function according to a set of moral principles and customary rules 
which govern the behaviour of the individuals within them. Adherence to these rules is helped 
by the fact that communities are small, relationships are largely family based, and historical ties 
are strong. In addition, the high level of interdependence in the herding economy, the high 
risks involved, and the high potential for seasonal or transient poverty, means that the benefits 
of collective action and mutual insurance are recognised by all, and cooperative practices are 
likely to be sustained over the long term. Households are therefore more likely to fulfill 
obligations in for example, pooling labour for collective tasks, returning a loan or respecting 
the traditional use rights of others. 
However the collective rules which govern customary institutions are most effective when 
operating within small communities and a stable social and economic environment. With broad 
changes in the herding environment taking place, the potential for customary institutions to be 
undermined has increased. 
Support for the poor is often only provided by related households who are also poor, and 
therefore vulnerable to the same income and consumption risks. Also, the poor are less able to 
benefit from risk pooling and reciprocal relations between households, because they have less 
to offer initially in the way of goods or assets. As a result, the commonest way in which the 
very poor are able to participate in customary arrangements is by supplying labour. Since the 
herding economy is defined by labour scarcity this does allow for the creation of mutually 
advantageous relationships. However, for poor people who are also old or infirm, and whose 
labour power is negligible, the basis for support rests entirely on the continued altruistic 
behaviour of kin and neighbours. 
As patterns of wealth differentiation have increased so the practice of livestock-poor 
households providing labour for richer households in return for a guarenteed minimum 
subsistence is becoming more common. While this arrangement may provide advantages for 
both parties, the potential for exploitation of the poorer household is high. In addition these 
arrangements are often insecure and temporary since they are based largely on the seasonal 
labour requirements of rich households. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper has identified patterns of wealth differentiation and poverty in the Mongolian 
pastoral economy based on case study data from three different areas in Mongolia, and 
national and provincial statistics. The paper has argued that the nature of market reforms, the 
removal of collective subsidies and a reduction in services to rural households has made the 
range of climatic and economic risks faced by herders more, and has seriously reduced their 
ability to respond to market opportunity and to manage risk. The main findings are discussed 
below followed by a brief summary of policy reccommendations. 
The emergence of rural poverty 
1. Existing equalities between herding households under collectivisation have been 
exacerabated by the process of transition from a command to a market economy and led to an 
increase in absolute and relative rural poverty. 
2. The particular features which contributed to this include (i) the nature of the privatisation 
process, (ii) the timing and content of economic reforms, (iii) the removal of inputs and 
subsidies and (iv) the transfer of responsibility for livestock marketing and risk management 
from the state to the individual. 
3. The outcome of these processes has been rising prices and reduced access to basic goods, 
reduced market participation by the majority of herders, reduced protection from a range of 
climatic and economic risks and reduced access to a range of livestock, health and education 
services, all of which have led to an increase in poverty. 
Wealth differentiation 
1. Ownership of livestock and household herd size is the most significant way in which 
households differentiate between rich and poor. 
2. Examination of herd size distribution in the three case study areas revealed that there is a 
high concentration of wealth in the hands of richer households with the richest households 
owning between 40 and 50 percent of household herds and the poorest between 6 and 10 
percent of livestock. The proportion of households with a diverse herd structure also increases 
with wealth, giving wealthier households a greater capacity for risk spreading. 
Income, expenditure and marketing 
1. Analysis of the income and expenditure patterns of rural households reveal that poorer 
households are less able to exploit market opportunities and continue to rely heavily on 
support from the state in the form of pensions and benefits. In the current market environment, 
richer households are more able to withdraw from the market altogether; poorer households 
have less flexibility in this respect. 
2. Poor households suffer more than others from rising prices and poor terms of trade for 
livestock and livestock products. Small herd sizes mean that they have less potential for raising 
incomes through the sale of livestock products and are more likely to sell or exchange a 
greater proportion of their herd than other households to cover basic needs. This is likely to 
have a negative impact on herd growth over time. 
3. Overall, lower incomes mean that poorer households make fewer expenditures on non-food 
needs (such as clothing, inputs and services) and the greatest proportion of their income on 
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household food needs. Even so, poorer households spend one third less on food than richer 
households. 
The experience of rural poverty 
1. The rural poor have the following characteristics: they are livestock-poor households with 
lower incomes; they are on average younger, have higher dependency ratios and less herding 
experience than more wealthy households; they have smaller herds, a less diverse herd 
structure and fewer large stock for herding and transport. Households headed by women are 
more likely to be poor. 
2. The experience of poverty has important regional dimensions. Different poverty processes 
operate in different ecological areas and under different market conditions. In the mountain 
gobi region of Bayankhongor for example, the distribution of livestock wealth is highly 
unequal and households are more vulnerable to climatic stresses such as heavy snow and 
extreme temperatures. In the steppe region of Ovorkhangai, herders in Khakhorin sum, are 
more able to cope with increased risks as some elements of collective ownership and support 
remain: some dimensions of poverty are managed more effectively as poorer households are 
better protected from income shortfalls by monthly salaries and from livestock loss by 
subsidised winter feed supplements. 
Vulnerability and risk 
1. The changing level of risk faced by herders is probably the most significant factor 
contributing to increased wealth differentiation and poverty among rural households. 
2. Apart from economic risks, the most significant risk herders face (in certain vulnerable 
regions) is the risk of livestock loss from heavy snow or dzud. Evidence suggests that the 
proportion of livestock losses incurred by poorer households is considerably higher than those 
of richer households and seriously threatens the viability of some of the poorest herders. 
3. These data also show that the extent to which households are able to prepare for and 
response to this type of disaster is, at least in part, related to their wealth status. 
Support to the poor 
1. Formal support to poor herding households is limited and hampered by the use of 
inappropriate poverty measurements and very limited funds available to rural households. 
2. Case study data shows that the poorest households in the herding community rely heavily 
on the support of kin and neighbours to maintain subsistence, and that the role of customary 
institutions is becoming increasingly important in providing the first line of assistance to the 
poor and vulnerable. 
3. Customary institutions are reasonably effective at providing assistance at individual level but 
are less effective at coping with climatic or other risks which affect an entire community at the 
same time, other than by developing cooperative labour and other arrangements. 
Policies to reduce rural poverty 
Growth in the livestock sector is the main way in which poverty issues can be addressed in 
Mongolia. The aim should be to concentrate on the development of labour-intensive growth 
and an effective safety net to protect the poor and vulnerable in the rural economy. 
56 
Poverty measurement and targeting 
Poverty measurement and targeting is at present based on an income measure of poverty 
which is inappropriate for the rural economy. It is difficult to measure and misleading in an 
economy where much of production goes directly to own consumption, where most trade is in 
the form of barter, and where wealth is more closely related to ownership of assets (livestock) 
than to levels of income. The minimum income line does not coincide with herders' definitions 
of poverty. 
This problem should be addressed in several ways. First, the definition of vulnerable groups 
should be extended to include households with small herds who are a particularly vulnerable 
section of the poor. As part of this a distinction should be made between herders and sum 
centre residents since different poverty thresholds are required for different groups. 
Second, measurement of rural poverty should be based on a measure of household per capita 
livestock wealth, calculated in traditional Mongolian bod units. This is the measure most 
commonly used among herders themselves and remains constant over time while measures 
based on market values do not. This measure should be determined at local level and be 
representative of local ecological and economic conditions. 
Third, lists of poor and extremely poor households should be drawn up locally by sum based 
poverty committees, composed of sum and bag governors, officials, livestock company 
officials, and herder representatives. Lists would indicate whether households were poor 
because of incapacity or lack of livestock. 
Safety nets 
This paper has shown how important social security provision is to the incomes of poor rural 
households. Reform of social security provision is currently being debated by government 
based on reccommendations made by the ILO. Over the long term this is likely to result in 
social security provision being increasingly targeted at the poorest, with the removal of wide 
ranging pension and benefit provisions. 
Draft social insurance laws are currently being developed, and by 1996 they will be entirely 
based on employer and employee contributions. This would exclude all those not in formal 
employment including most herders. No decison has yet been made as to whether herder 
contributions for certain types of benefits and insurance should become compulsory or 
voluntary. While herders' statutory rights to pensions and benefits will not be affected if, as is 
likely, voluntary contributions for livestock insurance are introduced it is unlikely that the 
majority of herders will take up such insurance. The particular needs of the livestock sector 
should be considered carefully, including the possible introduction of compulsory livestock 
insurance with reduced premiums for the poorest. 
The livestock sector, which has suffered most in the contraction of public service provison to 
the rural areas, should be compensated through the expanded Social Assistance Fund which is 
currently being developed. This could be done through the provision of food stamps to 
children of poor households, to offset the new costs of education and health, and with one-off 
payments for the poorest to enable them to directly purchase expensive items such as winter 
clothing. 
Credit 
As discussed in chapter 8, informal mechanisms by which poor herding households receive 
credit are valuable. However, customary mechanisms are not able to meet some needs, such as 
the need for long-term loans of breeding females to allow poor households to build their herds 
or to replace high losses incurred during climatic disasters. Formal credit institutions are 
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unwilling at present to provide herders with credit since they do not accept livestock as 
collateral, so there may be a need to improve poor households access to subsidised credit 
possibly through group lending. 
Group access to credit could be organised through customary institutions such as the khot ail 
or wider neighbourhood groups, while restocking of poor households could be better 
organised through existing livestock companies who would extend credit in the form of 
livestock to poor households to increase their herds over a set time period. 
In addition credit should be made available to private individuals, khorshoo cooperatives, 
companies and traders to develop local marketing and processing which are constrained by 
existing credit arrangements and have limited access to capital and spare parts. The availability 
of credit for the development of local processing could have important implications for the 
rural poor, especially women, since this might provide employment for those seeking 
alternative incomes outside herding, such as single women with few animals and limited 
labour. 
Managing emergencies and collective risk 
The management of collective risk, which was comprehensive during the collective period, has 
been almost entirely removed as a result of economic liberalisation. Urgent attention should be 
paid to the development of policies to address rural emergencies such as drought or dzud. 
These would include the development of: 
- a clear policy of planned response to emergencies when they occur. 
- policies to strengthen kin and neighbourhood responses through for example, group 
insurance of livestock. 
- policies to strengthen the ability of the State Emergency Fodder Fund to respond to dzud 
emergencies, including the restocking of regional fodder stores financed by receipts from local 
grazing and animal taxes. 
- research to assess the probability of dzud and other large scale emergencies in different 
ecological regions and appropriate responses. 
Health, education and veterinery services 
The ability of the poor to escape poverty partly depends on their access to health, education 
and veterinary services. The type and level of services provided during the collective period 
are no longer feasible and attention should be paid to ways in which static sum based services 
can be maintained through the introduction of some cost recovery, alongside the development 
of more mobile services. The state should take responsibility for providing health and 
veterinary insurance for the most vulnerable so that the poor are not penalised. 
Sum based services require urgent assistance to cover the costs of vehicle maintenance, drugs, 
equipment and electricity. This is one area where donors can make immediate interventions 
while the development of cost recovery mechanisms take place. 
The long-term focus should be directed towards the development of more localised and mobile 
health, education and veterinery services. This could be achieved through bag level schools, 
distance learning, and increased training for bag level health and veterinery personnel. 
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Strengthening customary institutions 
Customary institutions should not be ignored in the development of policies to enable rural 
people themselves to mange rural poverty alongside more formal institutions. One way to 
reduce transient poverty would be to transfer information and skills from experienced to new 
herders through such groups. 
Strengthened customary groups could also act as the focus for group-based lending, marketing 
and emergency assistance, and to provide representatives on poverty committees at sum level, 
and local representatives for health, veterinery and education services. Groups which could be 
strengthened include khot ails and neighbourhood groups which overlap with more formal 
institutions such as livestock companies and the bag. At present it is these companies and bag 
governors who represent herder interests in the sum administration and development agencies. 
Herders themselves have expressed the view that alternative institutions which can represent 
their views at a wider level, and in a more representative manner are needed. 
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APPENDIX 1: PRIVATE LIVESTOCK HOLDINGS BY SUM 
Table 24. Private livestock holdings by species, by wealth quartile, Tariat sum, 
Arkhangai 
Camel Horse Cattle Sheep Goat 
Bag Total 0 1271 3434 5936 528 
Average P/Household 0 8.0 21.6 37.3 3.3 
1 st Quartile 
Total 0 515 1446 2487 230 
Percent of Total 0 40.5 42.1 41.9 43.6 
Average P/Household 0 13.2 37.1 63.8 5.9 
2nd Quartile 
Total 0 350 971 1692 144 
Percent of Total 0 27.5 28.3 28.5 27.3 
Average P/Household 0 8.8 24.3 42.3 3.6 
3 rd Quartile 
Total 0 277 631 1157 95 
Percent of Total 0 21.8 18.4 19.5 18 
Average P/Household 0 6.9 15.8 28.9 2.4 
4th Quartile 
Total 0 129 386 600 59 
Percent of Total 0 10.1 11.2 10.1 11.2 
Average P/Household 0 3.2 9.7 15.0 1.5 
Source: Sum statistics 
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Table 25. Livestock holdings by species by wealth quartile, Kharkhorin sum, 
Ovorkhangai 
Camel Horse Cattle Sheep Goat 
Bag Total 27.0 1063 1315 3778 1209 
Average P/Household 0.2 7.9 9.7 28.0 9.0 
1 st Quartile 
Total 21 451 661 1729 546 
Percent of Total 77.8 42.4 50.3 45.8 45.2 
Average P/Household 0.6 13.7 20.0 52.4 16.5 
2nd Quartile 
Total 1 263 331 988 384 
Percent of Total 3.7 24.7 25.2 26.2 31.8 
Average P/Household 0.0 7.7 9.7 29.1 11.3 
3 rd Quartile 
Total 5 223 207 648 206 
Percent of Total 18.5 21 15.7 17.2 17 
Average P/Household 0.1 6.6 6.1 19.1 6.1 
4th Quartile 
Total 0 126 116 413 73 
Percent of Total 0 11.9 8.8 10.9 6.0 
Average P/Household 0 3.7 3.4 12.1 2.1 
Source: Sum statistics 
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Table 26. Livestock holdings by species, by wealth quartile, Bayan-Tsagaan sum, 
Bayankhongor 
Camel Horse Cattle Sheep Goat 
Bag Total 266 791 592 11748 9338 
Average P/Household 3.7 1.6 4.9 3.6 72.1 
1st Quartile 
Total 146 352 371 6331 4273 
Percent of Total 54.9 44.5 62.7 53.9 45.7 
Average P/Household 3.6 8.6 9 154.4 104.2 
2nd Quartile 
Total 70 251 153 2876 2654 
Percent of Total 26.3 31.7 25.8 24.5 28.4 
Average P/Household 1.7 6 3.6 68.5 63.2 
3rd Quartile 
Total 36 135 63 1960 1642 
Percent of Total 13.5 17.1 10.6 16.7 17.6 
Average P/Household 0.9 3.2 1.5 46.7 39.1 
4th Quartile 
Total 14 53 5 581 769 
Percent of Total 5.3 6.7 0.8 4.9 8.2 
Average P/Household 0.4 1.4 0.1 15.3 20.2 
Source: Sum statistics 
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APPENDIX 2: COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME - ERDENE SUM, 
DORNOGOBI AND IKH TAMIR AND TARIAT SUMS, ARKHANGAI, 1990-1993 
Table 27. Composition of average annual household monetary income, Erdene sum, 
Doritogobi, 1990-1993 
Year 1990 1992 1993 
No. ofhhs 7 3 10 
Average Annual Household Income (Tugrik) 
Salary & Bonuses 13274.8 18000.0 4442.0 
Product Sales 2330.1 23860.3 63467.1 
State Benefits 748.6 5876.0 5502.0 
Other 893.6 400.0 4232.6 
Total 17247.1 48136.3 77643.7 
Per cent 
Salary & Bonuses 76.9 37.4 5.7 
Product Sales 13.5 49.6 81.7 
State Benefits 4.3 12.2 7.1 
Other 5.2 0.8 5.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Mearns 1991, Cooper and Narangerel 1993 & this paper. 
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Table 28. Composition of average annual household monetary income, Ikh Tamir 
and Tariat sums, Arkhangai 
Year 1990 1992 1993 
Sum Ikh Tamir Tariat Tariat 
No. of hhs 5 3 4 
Average Annual Household Income (Tugrik) 
Salary & Bonuses 10233.4 1200.0 0.0 
Product Sales 1815.0 14116.6 20082.5 
State Benefits 920.0 10758.0 4325.0 
Other 288.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 13256.4 26074.6 24407.5 
Per cent 
Salary & Bonuses 77.2 4.6 0.0 
Product Sales 13.7 54.1 82.3 
State Benefits 6.9 41.3 17.7 
Other 2.2 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Mearns 1991, Cooper and Narangerel 1993, and this paper. 
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APPENDIX 3: MONETARY INCOME BY WEALTH GROUP 
Table 29. Average annual household monetary income by wealth group, 1992-93 (42 
households) (Tugrik) 
Group 
1 
(Richest) 
Group 
2 
Group 
3 
Group 
4 
(Poorest) 
No. of Households 11 10 12 9 
Live Animals 
Milk products 
Wool/Hair 
Cashmere 
Hides/Skins 
Salaries 
Pensions/B enefits 
Aid/Assistance 
Other 
22668.8 
1848.2 
6915.2 
21742.5 
1458.2 
6181.8 
6812.0 
1665.1 
4507.8 
27420.5 
300.0 
14272.0 
21080.0 
1726.0 
1940.0 
14715.0 
0.0 
1100.0 
18058.7 
1081.7 
2124.8 
9769.5 
1109.2 
6670.0 
3569.0 
75.8 
2651.9 
17178.8 
1177.8 
3560.4 
2855.6 
524.4 
6157.8 
7385.3 
0.0 
2333.3 
Total 73799.5 82553.5 45110.5 41173.4 
Source: 42 household survey 
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APPENDIX 4: LIVESTOCK HOLDINGS OF POOREST HOUSEHOLDS 
Table 30. Average total private livestock (LS) holdings of poorest households, 
Tariat sum, Arkhangai compared with bag average for Tsagaan Nuur bag, Tariat sum, 
Arkhangai 
Tsagaan Nuur bag Tariat sum average 
Bag Poorest Poor Poor Herding 
Average Quartile H-holds H-holds 
Household Size 4.3 3.2 5.0 4.6 
Total Private LS 70.2 29.4 25.0 26.5 
Standard Deviation 36.4 9.4 13.1 12.8 
LS Per Person 20.2 14.7 5.7 6.7 
Standard Deviation 12.2 10.5 3.5 3.5 
Total Private LS 35.3 15.2 11.2 12.7 
(Bod Units) 
Standard Deviation 17.8 4.7 6.7 7.2 
LS Per Person 10.3 7.9 2.7 3.3 
(Bod Units) 
NB. Poor Households = Both sum centre and herding households classified by the 
administration as absolute poor in Tariat sum in 1993. The data show that among absolute 
poor households, average household size is slightly higher than the average for Tsajgaan Nuur 
bag and quite a bit higher than the average household size for the poorest quartile in Tsagaan 
Nuur bag. Total private livestock holdings are not much lower than the average figure for the 
poorest quartile in Tsagaan Nuur but higher household size means that figures for livestock 
per person are more than a third less than the bag average for both poor groups. 
Source: Sum statistics 
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TABLE 31. Average total livestock (LS) holdings of poorest households, Bayan 
Tsagaan sum, Bayankhongor, compared with average for bag No.l. in same sum 
Household Size 
Total LS 
Standard Deviation 
LS Per Person 
Standard Deviation 
Total LS (bod 
Units) 
Standard Deviation 
LS Per Person 
(bod Units) 
Bag No. 1 
Bag 4th 
Average Quartile 
3.7 2.1 
194.1 58.5 
145.4 29.3 
61.5 40.6 
39.2 25.3 
32.9 9.4 
24.1 4.3 
10.5 5.9 
Sum average 
Poor Poor Herding 
H-holds H-holds 
5.2 5.2 
75.5 85.5 
46.3 46.1 
14.8 16.8 
9.9 9.9 
13.6 15.7 
9.2 8.9 
2.8 3.2 
NB. Poor Households = Both sum centre and herding households classified by the 
administration as absolute poor in Bayan Tsagaan sum in 1993. The data include both private 
and leased livestock as the poverty statistics were not disaggregated. Here, average total 
livestock numbers for absolute poor households are higher than for the poorest quartile in Bag 
No. 1. However average figures for livestock per person are just under a third less than those 
for the poorest quartile. 
Source: Sum statistics 
( 
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APPENDIX 5: DZUD IN BAYAN TSAGAAN SUM, BAYANKHONGOR AIMAG 
Between 15 and 23 March 1993, Bayankhongor aimag received very heavy snowfall 
throughout the aimag. The western areas of the aimag were the worst affected. By March 23 
the sum had an average snow cover of 50 cms. In the mountain areas of the first bag, snow 
reached depths of 70 cms to 1 metre; in other areas the depth was about 30 cms. This level of 
snow cover was high compared with normal years, when a maximum snow depth of 20 cms is 
expected. Usually the snow covers pasture for only a few days and is removed by strong 
winds. 
Dzud (or freezing snow) is a frequent occurence in this part of Mongolia although often very 
localised. Serious dzud or disasters, where no movement by camel or vehicle is possible for 
the greater part of the dzud period, occurs less frequently. Sum officials said other serious 
dzuds had occurred in 1964, 1967 and 1988 but even then the degree of movement possible 
was better than in 1993. 
Livestock losses 
The total loss of livestock in the sum was 39,000, made up of 19,000 adult livestock and 
20,000 young animals. In the worst affected area in the south west of 1st bag, herders lost 
between 50 and 70 percent of their herds. 
Case study data suggests that heavy livestock losses were incurred for several reasons. Many 
households were moving their animals between winter and spring shelters at the time of the 
dzud. As a result it was difficult for them to reach shelter for the animals. Few households 
had any remaining hay or fodder to give to the animals and only got supplementary supplies 
from the sum centre after the fourth day of the dzud during which time greatest losses were 
incurred. Some households, particularly those with limited labour, found they were unable to 
take the animals to pasture for at least a month. During this time they kept animals in shelters 
and fed them hay and fodder once it was available. They were unable to make trails through 
the snow to enable the animals to reach pasture. 
Herders response to the dzud 
Herders' overall response to the dzud seemed to be strongly based on labour availability and 
wealth status. In most cases studied, herders were either moving between shelters or still 
resident at winter shelters when the dzud occured. Households were in general isolated, and 
many women heads of household, who as a rule manage labour shortages by drawing on 
relatives living elsewhere at peak times, were on their own, not anticipating the need for extra 
help. Households with additional labour were able to clear snow for the animals and go to the 
sum centre to get fodder and hay for the animals. In most cases, households received 
additional assistance from relatives who brought fodder and hay from the sum centre. 
In most cases, households did not have any stores of fodder or hay to give to animals 
immediately. Either they had not purchased fodder and hay before the winter or supplies had 
already been used. Some households stated that they wanted to buy more supplies but the 
cost of fodder and transport was too high. In the case of one richer household, fodder was 
stored in a building near the winter shelter but was only accessible after three days. Most 
households made regular trips during the dzud to the sum centre where they purchased fodder 
and hay at reduced prices from the Emergency fund. Some fodder and hay was given to all 
households free. Access to transport animals for this purpose was important. Only the very 
rich households were able to move the household and livestock to better pasture. One 
household paid 4,000 tugrig in cash and 3 sheep to the driver of a vehicle who helped him 
move. 
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Aimag level response to the dzud 
The response to the dzud was coordinated at aimag level by the aimag Emergency 
Commission whose main responsibility is to coordinate response to natural disaster through 
the mobilisation of petrol and vehicles, emergency fodder, hospital and veterinery services. 
Bayan Tsagaan was the first sum to receive assistance with helicopters carrying food and 
clothing providing initial assistance. Snow clearing machines and trucks were also sent from 
the aimag centre and Ulaanbaatar, although transportation by road was impossible for the first 
eight or nine days of the dzud. 
The sum received immediate assistance from OverKhangai army division who brought fodder 
and hay by truck. The sum delivered fodder and hay from emergency reserves by truck and 
camel mainly free of charge to herding households. Few herders had their own supplies left as 
late as March. Although the 1992/3 winter had been relatively mild and the animals were 
reasonably strong after ten days without supplementary feed, substantial losses were incurred. 
Cost of the assistance 
The state-funded Central Emergency Commission provided 90 percent of the budget for the 
aimag level operations. The cost of March 1993 assistance totalled 6-700 million. The aimag 
provided reduced cost fodder to sum administrations, companies and khorshoos. The state 
provided an additional 87 million tg to replace livestock lost as a result of the dzud. Included 
in this figure were donations made by other state, private and international organisations. This 
was divided equally and allocated to sum administrations were then responsible for purchasing 
livestock for their sums. 
Bayan Tsagaan sum received 3.5 million tugrig from the Ministry of Finance to buy livestock 
as well as some additional donations from international and private organisations. The sum 
bought 146 horses from Dornogobi aimag at a cost of 15,000 each and 40 camels from a 
southern sum for 30,000 tugrig each. Herders of Khovd aimag donated 700 sheep and goats. 
The sum is to receive another 3.5 million in the future with which it will buy sheep and goats. 
The sum has no other plans for restocking in the future. 
The livestock were distributed among those herders worst affected according to the size of the 
herd before the dzud and the proportional impact of the dzud on the herd. Wealth status was 
also taken into account. 
